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I. INTRODUCTION
On January 30, 2020, the world unknowingly changed forever when the World 
Health Organization announced that a novel coronavirus originating from Wuhan, China, 
was a public health emergency of international concern.1 By March 13, 2020, United 
States President Donald J. Trump had declared a national emergency due to the rapid 
spread of the highly contagious virus SARS-CoV-2, also known as “COVID-19.”2 The 
COVID-19 pandemic caused the worst economic disaster in global history.3 While the 
long-term effects of the U.S. quarantine have yet to be fully recognized, the consequences 
on the American economy and judicial system are already emerging with the reopening of 
a new and unprecedented society.  
This article provides a comprehensive guide for insurance defense of COVID-19 
claims and litigating in a post-pandemic American judicial system. Part II begins with an 
analysis of business interruption litigation and litigation strategies to defend against claims 
from civil authority orders.4 Part III shifts the focus to major lawsuits against directors and 
officers from the COVID-19 pandemic and the strongest defenses against liability.5 Part 
IV moves toward general liability against employers for third-party bodily injury and harm 
from COVID-19 infection and exposure.6 Part V focuses on employee discrimination and 
retaliation claims and legal defenses.7 Part VI examines the devastating cases of nursing 
home negligence and wrongful death from COVID-19 outbreaks in long term care 
facilities and the applicable laws and defenses to each claim.8 Part VII analyzes the 
categories of COVID-19 class action litigation and specific litigation strategies available 
* Alisa Baird is Chief Corporate Compliance Officer for Cura Digital Health Solutions. The author received her 
Juris Doctor from the University of Tulsa College of Law and a Masters of Business Administration with a focus 
in Healthcare Administration from Oklahoma Christian University. The author thanks her family and her editors 
of this publication.  
 1. Rolling updates on coronavirus disease (COVID-19), WHO (June 17, 2020),  
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/events-as-they-happen. 
 2. Letter from Donald J. Trump, U.S. President, to Secretary Wolf, Secretary Mnuchin, Secretary Azar, and 
Administrator Gaynor (Mar. 13, 2020) (on file with the White House), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/letter-president-donald-j-trump-emergency-determination-stafford-act/. 
3. Coronavirus shock vs. global financial crisis—the worst economic disaster, DW,
https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-shock-vs-global-financial-crisis-the-worse-economic-disaster/a-52802211 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2021). 
4. See infra Part II. 
5. See infra Part III. 
6. See infra Part IV. 
7. See infra Part V. 
8. See infra Part VI. 
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to party-defendants.9 Finally, Part VIII gives an overview of juror mentalities and awards 
throughout historical times of crisis and predictions for COVID-19 nuclear verdicts.10   
II. BUSINESS INTERRUPTION LOSSES
Businesses in nearly every United States industry suffered significant damage from 
the COVID-19 economic shutdown. This reality has led to the inevitable dispute between 
business owners and insurance providers over whether insurers should pay the financial 
losses sustained by the closures and how much, if any, is recoverable. As a result, the 
American legal system has been flooded with litigation against defendant insurers for 
recovery of COVID-19 business interruption losses. As insurance defense litigation will 
be overwhelmed with these cases for the next several years, it is necessary that defendant 
insurers understand which business interruption lawsuits are viable, their strongest 
defenses, and how to calculate business losses from government-ordered shutdowns.  
A. Civil Authority Orders of Natural Disasters. 
Civil authority orders are common provisions found within the business interruption 
coverage of a commercial property insurance policy. These provisions commonly apply 
when access to the insured’s property is prohibited due to a governmental order issued as 
a result of direct physical loss or damage to the business owner’s property or to the 
property adjacent to the business.11 This coverage is most often triggered after a natural 
disaster scenario which leaves the land and business structures damaged or destroyed.12
Hurricanes, tornados, and wildfires are all types of natural disasters which may cause 
federal, state, or local governments to shut down access to certain areas of a community 
due to hazardous conditions left in the wake of the catastrophe.13 Business losses during 
the government-ordered prohibition from access to the employer’s property may be 
recoverable under these provisions.14
Some of the most contentious areas of COVID-19 litigation center around debating 
the validity of business interruption claims and the calculation of business losses during 
the pandemic shutdown.15 While the courts have historically never had an opportunity to 
9. See infra Part VII. 
10. See infra Part VIII. 
 11. It should be noted that some policies are written to cover losses resulting only from direct physical loss 
or damage to property adjacent to the business, and not damage to the owner’s property itself. See generally
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of the State of Pa., 439 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2006); Kelaher, Connell & Conner, 
P.C. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 440 F. Supp. 3d 520 (D.S.C. 2020). 
12. See, e.g., Kelaher, 440 F. Supp. 3d 520; Assurance Co. Am. v. BBB Serv. Co., 593 S.E.2d 7 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2003). 
13. See, e.g., Kelaher, 440 F. Supp. 3d 520; Assurance Co., 593 S.E.2d 7. 
14. See, e.g., Kelaher, 440 F. Supp. 3d 520. 
15. See, e.g., Bethan Moorcraft, Chubb sued by human rights non-profit over COVID-19 business 
interruption coverage, INS. BUS. AM. (Apr. 29, 2020), 
https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/news/breaking-news/chubb-sued-by-human-rights-nonprofit-over-
covid19-business-interruption-coverage-221072.aspx; Lyle Adriano, Six insurers face federal class action 
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interpret a virus in the context of inclusionary losses, that precedent is forthcoming.16 At 
least six (6) major insurance providers are now named defendants in civil class action 
lawsuits by business owners seeking recovery of COVID-19 business interruption 
losses.17
B. COVID-19 Business Interruption Defenses. 
When an insurance company is sued for the recovery of business interruption losses 
resulting from the COVID-19 economic shutdown, there are several defenses it must raise 
in order to successfully litigate the exclusion. Plaintiffs have a difficult burden showing 
COVID-19 civil authority orders are within the subject policy’s intended inclusionary 
losses. The first argument a defendant must raise is the element of direct physical loss or 
damage to property. Since civil authority orders require physical loss or damage to the 
business owner’s property or to the property adjacent to the business, defendant insurers 
must litigate on the grounds that the virus does not satisfy this element of the claim.18
Plaintiffs’ attorneys have gone on the attack with creative arguments in an attempt to 
satisfy the property damage requirement.19 Plaintiffs argue that the coronavirus constitutes 
property damage because it “physically infects and stays on surfaces of objects or 
materials” and the virus contamination causes “a direct physical loss needing remediation 
to clean the surfaces of the establishment.”20 At best, this argument is weak and lacks 
primary authority and context. 
Historically,  courts have held that the “physical loss or damage” burden is met when 
“an item of tangible property has been physically altered by perils such as fire or water.”21
Albeit, a virus may cause physical harm to a human being, but it cannot visibly alter the 
tangible structure of a business. Insurance defendants must argue longstanding law that 
“physical damage” by its ordinary meaning excludes damage that does not physically
disturb the building structure or is incorporeal.22
However, even if courts find the virus satisfies the property damage or loss 
requirement, defendant insurers may successfully develop a litigation strategy based on 
the rationale for the shutdown. Every state across the country has experienced its own 
unique set of quarantine orders. State governors and local lawmakers each developed their 
own rules and enforcement for non-essential business shutdowns.23 An insurance 
16. See, e.g., Moorcraft, supra note 15; Adriano, supra note 15. 
 17. The insurance company defendants are Aspen American Insurance, Auto-Owners Insurance, Lloyd’s of 
London, Society Insurance, Oregon Mutual Insurance, and Topa Insurance Company. Adriano, supra note 15. 
18. See generally United Air Lines, 439 F.3d 128; Kelaher, 440 F. Supp. 3d 520; MRI Healthcare Ctr. 
Glendale, Inc. v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 187 Cal. App. 4th 766 (2010). 
 19. See Complaint, French Laundry Partners, LP, et al. v. Hartford Fire Ins., et al. (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 
2020). 
20. See Complaint, Cajun Conti LLC, et al. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, et al., No. 2020-CC-
01183 (2020) (available at https://www.insurancejournal.com/research/app/uploads/2020/03/Oceana-Petition-
for-Dec-J-executed.pdf).  
21. MRI Healthcare, 187 Cal. App. 4th at 778–79 (internal quotations omitted). 
22. See generally id.; Complaint, French Laundry Partners (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 2020). 
23. See, e.g., Press Release, OFF. TEX. GOVERNOR GREG ABBOTT, Governor Abbot Issues Executive Order, 
Implements Statewide Essential Services And Activities Protocols (Mar. 31, 2020) (on file with author); Okla. 
Exec. Order No. 2020-04 (Mar. 28, 2020), https://www.cityoftulsa.org/media/12617/2020-04.pdf; J. Clay 
Jenkins, Safer At Home Order, DALLAS CTY. (Apr. 18, 2020), 
4
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defendant may succeed in litigation by arguing that the business did not close due to 
property damage by the virus, but that the shutdown orders came as a result of a public 
health crisis. As civil authority orders require the government’s interference with a 
business to be the direct result of physical damage or loss of the insured’s property or the 
property adjacent to it, then all shutdowns made from fear of the outbreak or as 
precautionary measures do not satisfy the requirement.24
This distinction was emphasized by the court in Jones Walker when Plaintiffs filed 
suit for business income losses as a result of shutdown orders over Hurricane Gustav.25
The Mayor of New Orleans, Louisiana, ordered a mandatory evacuation and “cited 
anticipated high tides and the possibility of hurricane-force winds and widespread severe 
flooding among [other factors]” which made the shutdown necessary.26 The Jones Walker
court held that the Plaintiff could not establish the required nexus between the civil 
authority order and the actual property damage or loss from the hurricane because the 
prohibition was issued in anticipation of a possible catastrophic occurrence.27
Consequently, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted and business 
interruption losses were denied by the court.28
In United Air Lines, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of State of Pennsylvania, Plaintiff United Air 
Lines, Inc. (“United”) sued Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania (“ISOP”) 
seeking indemnity for losses suffered as a result of September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks 
on the New York City World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia.29
United had a ticket office in the World Trade Center which was destroyed during the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.30 It was not disputed that United could recover for 
lost earnings attributable to the ticket office’s physical damage.31 However, United’s 
Arlington facilities suffered no significant physical damage as a result of the attack on the 
Pentagon.32
The court determined that, for United to recover business losses, it would be 
“required to demonstrate that the business interruption at issue resulted from either 1) 
physical damage to property at the insured location in question, i.e., the Airport, or 2) an 
order of civil authority as a direct result of physical damage to property adjacent to the 
insured location in question.”33
In granting the Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court held it was 
factually impossible for United to show that its facilities closed as a direct result of damage 
to the Pentagon; the airport’s shutdown occurred prior to the attack on the Pentagon.34 The 
https://www.dallascounty.org/Assets/uploads/docs/covid-19/orders-media/041820-DallasCountyOrder.pdf. 
 24. Order and Reasons at 6–7, Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, LLP v. Chubb Corp. 
et al., No. 09-6057 (E.D. La. Oct. 11, 2020). 
25. Id. at 2. 
26. Id. at 2. 
27. Id. at 4 (emphasis added). 
28. Id. at 14–15. 




 33. United contends that the Pentagon fulfilled this requirement. Id.
34. United Air Lines, 439 F.3d at 134. 
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court explained that the government’s decision to halt air travel was based on fears of 
future attacks and not the result of destruction to the Pentagon.35 COVID-19 government 
shutdown orders are generally a comparable scenario. Several U.S. states and local 
governments closed non-essential businesses as a preventative public health control 
measure during the early stages of the pandemic.36
For example, Governor Gina Raimondo of Rhode Island went to great lengths to 
attempt to protect the state from outsiders fleeing to Rhode Island seeking refuge from 
neighboring states with high infection rates.37 With the largest pandemic crisis centered 
around New York City, Governor Raimondo conceded that a surge in Rhode Island cases 
was inevitable and that the state must prepare for a state-wide public health crisis.38
Accordingly, insurance defendants litigating in states such as Rhode Island have a strong 
defense that the civil authority orders were responsive to the anticipation of a catastrophic 
COVID-19 occurrence and not due to an actual outbreak of high magnitude. 
Next, a defendant insurer may prevail on the plain language within the government’s 
civil authority order.39 Plaintiffs seeking compensation for business interruption losses 
must show a complete prohibition to access their property during the government-ordered 
shutdown.40 For now, this requirement is somewhat of an overlooked caveat in COVID-
19 business interruption litigation.41 The majority of non-essential business shutdowns do 
not completely prohibit the owner from accessing their property.42 For example, the 
majority of states followed the White House and Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention guidelines, which directed citizens to avoid eating and drinking in bars, 
restaurants, and food courts.43 State and local government shutdowns prohibited in-person 
dining at these establishments but allowed the non-essential businesses to remain open for 
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Georgia Governor Brian Kemp announced that he made the decision to initiate a civil authority 
order shutdown after learning that COVID-19 may be transmitted by non-symptomatic carriers. Greg Bluestein, 
Georgia governor to order shelter in place to curb coronavirus, AJC (Apr. 1, 2020), 
https://www.ajc.com/blog/politics/breaking-georgia-governor-orders-shelter-place-curb-
coronavirus/vdAoWkjq39W2usr9e8W8BL/. Missouri Governor Mike Parson announced the state’s need to “stay 
ahead of the battle” with the enforcement of his stay-at-home order. @GovParsonMO, TWITTER (Apr. 3, 2020, 
5:04 PM), https://twitter.com/GovParsonMO/status/1246196795107160064?s=20. 
 37. See R.I. Exec. Order No. 20-13 (Mar. 28, 2020), https://governor.ri.gov/documents/orders/Executive-
Order-20-13.pdf. 
38. See id.; G. Wayne Miller, R.I. Tightens Restrictions After 2 Virus Deaths, PROVIDENCE J. (Mar. 28, 2020, 
1:28 PM), https://www.providencejournal.com/news/20200328/ri-tightens-restrictions-after-2-virus-deaths.  
39. See S. Hospitality, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 393 F.3d 1137, 1139 (10th Cir. 2004). 
40. See id. at 1140 (emphasis added). 
41. See generally S. Hospitality, 393 F.3d 1137.
 42. For example, Alabama, Louisiana, Illinois and Texas are among many states that have limited non-
essential businesses such as restaurants to drive-through and takeout orders only. See Scott Harris, State Health 
Officer, Order of the State Health Officer Suspending Certain Public Gatherings Due to Risk of Infection by 
COVID-19 (Apr. 3, 2020), https://governor.alabama.gov/assets/2020/04/Final-Statewide-Order-4.3.2020.pdf; 
Ill. COVID-19 Exec. Order No. 8 (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www2.illinois.gov/Pages/Executive-
Orders/ExecutiveOrder2020-10.aspx; Tex. Exec. Order No. GA 14 (Mar. 31, 2020), 
https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/press/EO-GA-14_Statewide_Essential_Service_and_Activity_COVID-
19_IMAGE_03-31-2020.pdf. 
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drive-through, delivery, and takeout orders.44 Essentially, business owners were not 
completely prohibited from access to their property. The courts commonly rule in line with 
this argument in circumstances of natural disasters.45
In Southern Hospitality, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., an Oklahoma hotel owner 
(“Southern Hospitality”) sought business losses resulting from canceled reservations after 
U.S. air travel was halted by government order during the September 11, 2001, terrorist 
attacks.46 The dispute between the parties centered on what constituted prohibited access 
to the hotel’s property.47 The hotel’s business interruption coverage contained a civil 
authority order provision which read:  
Civil Authority. We will pay for the actual loss of Business Income you sustain and necessary 
Extra Expense caused by action of civil authority that prohibits access to the described 
premises due to direct physical loss of or damage to property, other than at the described 
premises, caused by or resulting from any Covered Cause of Loss. This coverage will apply 
for a period of up to two consecutive weeks from the date of that action.48
Southern Hospitality argued that the airport closures completely prohibited out-of-
state customers from accessing the hotel, which resulted in substantial business losses, and 
that the court should interpret this prohibition as an inclusionary business interruption.49
In its motion for summary judgment, Defendant insurer contended  the order did not 
actually prohibit hotel access but only frustrated it to some extent.50 Further, the hotel’s 
insurance policy was a contract under Oklahoma law and must be enforced by its plain 
and ordinary meaning.51
The Southern Hospitality court found that, while it was factually undisputed the 
hotel indeed remained open during the shutdown, the issue was whether the civil authority 
order constituted prohibited access to the property.52 The court reasoned that “the plain 
and ordinary meaning of ‘prohibit’ is to ‘formally forbid, esp. by authority’ or ‘prevent[,]’” 
and that “‘[a]ccess’ means ‘a way of approaching or reaching or entering.’”53 While the 
hotel’s business was frustrated by the shutdown, it did not completely deny access to the 
property.54
When the law is applied to COVID-19 cases, defendant insurers will likely prevail 
on summary judgment in a large percentage of business interruption claims by restaurant 
44. See, e.g., Scott Harris, State Health Officer, Order of the State Health Officer Suspending Certain Public 
Gatherings Due to Risk of Infection by COVID-19 (Apr. 3, 2020), 
https://governor.alabama.gov/assets/2020/04/Final-Statewide-Order-4.3.2020.pdf; Ill. COVID-19 Exec. Order 
No. 8 (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www2.illinois.gov/Pages/Executive-Orders/ExecutiveOrder2020-10.aspx; Tex. 
Exec. Order No. GA 14 (Mar. 31, 2020), https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/press/EO-GA-
14_Statewide_Essential_Service_and_Activity_COVID-19_IMAGE_03-31-2020.pdf. 
45. See, e.g., S. Hospitality, 393 F.3d 1137.  
46. Id. at 1138 
47. See id. at 1139–40. 
48. Id. at 1139 (emphasis added). 
49. Id. at 1139–40. 
50. S. Hospitality, 393 F.3d at 1140. 
51. Id. at 1139. 
 52. Id. at 1139–40. 
53. Id. at 1139–40. 
54. Id.
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and other non-essential business owners where business operations were frustrated but not 
completely prohibited during the economic shutdown.55
C. How to Calculate COVID-19 Business Losses. 
There are two widely accepted methods to calculate business interruption losses in 
natural disaster scenarios: the Post-Catastrophe Economy Ignored Approach and Post-
Catastrophe Economy Considered Approach.56 The majority of federal and state courts 
follow one of these two methods to calculate natural disaster business interruption losses.57
In the Post-Catastrophe Ignored Approach, business losses are calculated in a scenario as 
if the catastrophe never occurred.58 In other words, the value of the business interruption 
is determined solely on historical sales data.59 In the Post-Catastrophe Economy 
Considered Approach, business interruption losses consider a business’s profitability 
during a hypothetical scenario that the catastrophe occurred but the business was not 
damaged and remained open.60 In this approach, the actual profits after the business 
reopens are critical to the calculation.61
In cases where defendant insurers are responsible for COVID-19 business losses, it 
is necessary they understand lost profits analyses for business interruption claims. As 
previous litigation has shown, how business losses should be calculated is a heavily 
litigated area of the law; the outcome may mean the difference of millions of dollars.62
This risk is exemplified in the Fifth Circuit case, Catlin Syndicate Ltd. v. Imperial 
Palace of Mississippi, Inc., when Hurricane Katrina damaged the Imperial Palace casino, 
forcing a government-ordered shutdown.63 Once Imperial Palace reopened, its revenues 
spiked dramatically more than its pre-hurricane revenue.64 The main issue before the 
Imperial Palace court was how to compute the casino’s business losses.65 The parties’
disagreement on how the business interruption should be calculated was the difference of 
over $70 million.66
The insurance company argued the Post-Catastrophe Ignored Approach should be 
used and that the business losses should be based on Imperial Palace’s profits as if 
 55. See generally S. Hospitality, 393 F.3d 1137. 
56. See Christopher French, The Aftermath of Catastrophes: Valuing Business Interruption Insurance Losses,
30 GA. L.J. 461 (2014); compare Berk-Cohen Assocs., LLC v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 433 Fed. App’x 268 (5th 
Cir. 2011), with Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fisherman’s Paradise Boats Inc., No. 93-2349-CIV-GRAHAM, 1994 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 21068 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 1994). 
57. See sources cited supra note 56. 
58. See sources cited supra note 56. 
59. See sources cited supra note 56. 
60. See Christopher French, The Aftermath of Catastrophes: Valuing Business Interruption Insurance Losses,
30 GA. L.J. 461 (2014); compare Berk-Cohen Assocs., LLC v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 433 Fed. App’x 268 (5th 
Cir. 2011), with Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Fisherman’s Paradise Boats Inc., No. 93-2349-CIV-GRAHAM, 1994 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 21068 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 1994) (holding that taking advantage of economic opportunities such as an 
increase in demand after Hurricane Andrew was not within the scope of the policy). 
61. See sources cited supra note 60. 
 62. See Catlin Syndicate Ltd. v. Imperial Palace of Miss., Inc., 600 F.3d 511, 516 (5th Cir. 2010). 
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Hurricane Katrina had never hit.67 In other words, the court should only look at pre-
hurricane profits.68 In contrast, Imperial Palace argued that “the correct hypothetical was 
not one in which Hurricane Katrina did not strike at all; it was one in which Hurricane 
Katrina struck but did not damage Imperial Palace’s facilities.”69 Imperial Palace pushed 
for the Post-Catastrophe Considered Approach which included consideration of profits 
earned when it reopened after Katrina.70 The Imperial Palace court held it was a 
jurisdiction utilizing the Post-Catastrophe Economy Ignored Approach and that it would 
not “look prospectively to what occurred after the loss.”71 Thus, Imperial Palace was 
unable to benefit from its inflated revenue stream resulting from the natural disaster.72
III. DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY
On March 4, 2020, the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) released an 
order cautioning companies to inform investors of potential COVID-19-related business 
risks.73 Unfortunately, the SEC’s cautionary statement did not appear to prevent corrupt 
practices within the corporate sector.74 By April 2020, the first wave of allegations 
involving coronavirus-related securities fraud and misconduct by major corporate 
directors and officers (“D&O”) went public.75 Initially, there was a fair amount of 
skepticism as to whether any of these allegations of executive misconduct would ever see 
the light of a courtroom. After all, a D&O claim had never been litigated in connection 
with any other virus outbreak in recent history.76 This skepticism was quickly put to rest 
with the swift filings of securities class action lawsuits against two major corporations in 
the medical and tourism industries—Inovio Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and Norwegian Cruise 
Lines.77 The allegations against the directors and officers range from wrongful public 
misstatements to blatantly misleading sales tactics.78 As the American economy 
experiences tremendous obstacles from the COVID-19 pandemic, directors and officers 
must adjust to fulfill their fiduciary duties to their corporations and do so without running 
afoul of securities laws. 
67. Catlin Syndicate, Ltd., 600 F.3d at 513. 
 68. Id. 
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 516. The Court previously used the Post-Catastrophe Ignored Approach in Finger Furniture. Finger 
Furniture Co. v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 404 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 2005). 
72. See Catlin Syndicate, Ltd., 600 F.3d 511. 
 73. See S.E.C. Notice, 85 Fed. Reg. 17610 (Mar. 30, 2020). 
 74. See Complaint, McDermid, et al. v. Inovio Pharms., Inc., et al., No. 2:20-cv-01402-GJP (E.D. Pa. 2020); 
Complaint, Douglas, et al. v. Norwegian Cruise Lines, et al., No. 1:20-cv-21107 (S.D. Fla. 2020). 
75. See Complaint, McDermid, No. 2:20-cv-01402-GJP (2020); Complaint, Douglas, No. 1:20-cv-21107. 
 76. E.g., there were no securities lawsuits filed against directors or officers during the MERS, SARS, or Ebola 
outbreaks. See Philipp Strasser & Jan Phillip Meyer, Directors’ and Officers’ Liability in Times of a Global 
Pandemic Crisis - Do Desperate Times Really Call for Desperate Measures?, LEGAL500, https://www.vhm-
law.at/UserFiles/Media/downloads/docs/200330_PhS-JM_D-O-Liability_COVID19.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 
2021).  
 77. Complaint at 1, McDermid, No. 2:20-cv-01402-GJP; Complaint at 5, Douglas, No. 1:20-cv-21107. 
78. See Complaint, Douglas, No. 1:20-cv-21107. 
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A. Norwegian Cruise Lines and the COVID-19 Smokescreen. 
The COVID-19 outbreak tested the ethical standards of many businesses and 
corporations with the sudden and dramatic halt of the global economy. The dilemma was 
real for many corporate executives—disclose potential business/market-related 
disruptions and risk bankruptcy or keep up appearances to gain marketable securities.  
Certain shareholders highlighted this predicament in their securities class action 
lawsuit against Norwegian Cruise Lines (“Norwegian”), its Chief Executive Officer, Frank 
J. Del Rio (“Del Rio”), and Chief Financial Officer, Mark A. Kempa (“Kempa”).79
Plaintiffs to the lawsuit represent shareholders who purchased shares from February 20, 
2020, through March 12, 2020.80 The class period began on February 20, 2020, when 
Norwegian published its COVID-19 press release along with its Form 8-K filed with the 
SEC.81 The press release stated that Norwegian’s cruise sales flourished in spite of the 
pandemic and that the company was even ahead of its yearly sales goals.82 Norwegian 
partly attributed its success to having “proactively implemented several preventive 
measures to reduce potential exposure and transmission of COVID-19” and boasted that 
the company “has an exemplary track record of demonstrating its resilience in challenging 
environments.”83
On February 27, 2020, Norwegian filed a Form 10-K with the SEC which stated that 
the company “must meet the U.S. Public Health Service’s requirements” and noted that it 
was rated “at the top of the range of CDC and FDA scores achieved by the major cruise 
lines.”84 Norwegian cited its 10-K risk factors as “[t]he spread of the COVID-19
coronavirus, particularly in North America, could exacerbate its effect on [Norwegian].”85
Any future wide-ranging health scares would also likely “adversely affect [Norwegian’s] 
business, financial condition, and results of operations.”86 Shareholder Plaintiffs allege 
that these and several other statements within Norwegian’s SEC filings were intentionally 
inaccurate and misleading.87
Shareholder Plaintiffs allege that Norwegian’s D&Os made false and misleading 
statements and/or failed to disclose that: 
(1) the Company was employing sales tactics of providing customers with unproven and/or 
blatantly false statements about COVID-19 to entice customers to purchase cruises, thus 
endangering the lives of both their customers and crew members; and (2) as a result, 
Defendants’ statements regarding the Company’s business and operations were materially 
false and misleading and/or lacked a reasonable basis at all relevant times.88
Plaintiffs bolstered their claims by reference to allegedly leaked emails from 
 79. Complaint, Norwegian Cruise Lines, et al., No. 1:20-cv-21107 (2020). 
80. Id. at 1–2.
 81. Complaint at 5, Douglas, No. 1:20-cv-21107. Norwegian’s Form 8-K  contained its stable financial results 
for fourth quarter 2019 and year-end 2019. 
82. Id.
83. Id.
 84. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS LTD., ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K), at 33 (2019). 
85. Id. at 49. 
86. Id. at 41. 
 87. Complaint at 13–14, Douglas, No. 1:20-cv-21107. 
88. Id. at 7. 
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Norwegian executives grooming their employees on how to publicly downplay COVID-
19.89 In a March 11, 2020, Miami New Times exposé entitled “Leaked Emails: Norwegian 
Pressures Sales Team to Mislead Potential Customers About Coronavirus,” the first 
allegations of corporate misrepresentations were made against Norwegian.90 The article 
published a series of “leaked emails” which appear to show Norwegian executive officers 
directing sales staff to lie to customers about COVID-19 and pressuring them to make 
unrealistically high sales quotas during the industry slump.91 Employees were even 
provided scripted answers to give to customers, such as that the coronavirus cannot survive 
or infect people in the warm climates of the Caribbean.92
On March 12, 2020, the Washington Post ran an article entitled “Norwegian Cruise 
Line Managers Urged Salespeople to Spread Falsehoods About Coronavirus” which 
alleged even more misconduct by the corporation’s directors and officers.93 The article 
reported that leaked internal memoranda included statements such as “[t]he coronavirus 
will not affect you” and “Fact: Coronavirus in humans is an ‘overhyped pandemic 
scare.’”94 The article quotes unnamed company executives as being furious by the alleged 
email leaks and quotes one executive as stating, “[o]ne of our own ratted.”95
Following the negative press coverage, Norwegian’s share price dramatically 
dropped 26.7%—resulting in losses for investors.96 Plaintiff shareholders allege the losses 
were the direct result of the wrongful misstatements and misleading sales tactics of 
Norwegian directors and officers.97
B. Inovio Pharmaceuticals and the COVID-19 Bait-and-switch. 
On March 12, 2020, the second COVID-19-related securities class action lawsuit 
was filed against Inovio Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Inovio”) and its Chief Executive Officer, 
J. Joseph Kim (“Kim”).98 Plaintiff shareholders allege that, on February 14, 2020, Kim 
appeared on Fox Business News and announced Inovio had developed a COVID-19 
vaccine in only three (3) hours after obtaining the DNA sequence from the virus.99 Kim 
further declared that Inovio’s “goal is to start phase one human testing in the U.S. early 
this summer.”100 Inovio’s stock rose more than ten percent within days after the 
broadcast.101
89. Id. 
 90. Alexi C. Cardona, Leaked Emails: Norwegian Pressures Sales Team to Mislead Potential Customers 
About Coronavirus, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/coronavirus-
norwegian-cruise-line-leaked-emails-show-booking-strategy-11590056. 
 91. Id.; Complaint, Douglas, No. 1:20-cv-21107 (2020). 
92. Id.
 93. See Drew Harwell, Norwegian Cruise Line managers urged salespeople to spread falsehoods about 




 96. Complaint at 8, Douglas, No. 1:20-cv-21107. 
97. Id. at 14. 
 98. See Complaint, McDermid, No. 2:20-cv-01402-GJP. 
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On March 2, 2020, President Donald J. Trump had a meeting with several leaders in 
the medical and pharmaceutical industries to discuss the U.S. plan of action for the 
COVID-19 national crisis.102 The meeting was highly publicized and nationally broadcast 
through multiple media outlets.103 Kim attended this meeting at the White House on behalf 
of Inovio to discuss its medical breakthroughs with regard to the virus.104 While speaking 
to President Trump during the live broadcast, Kim again stated that Inovio had developed 
a COVID-19 vaccine within three (3) hours and that human testing would begin in April  
2020.105 After the White House conference, Inovio’s share price “more than quadrupled” 
reaching an intraday high of $19.36 on March 9, 2020.106
The excitement would not last long. On March 9, 2020—the same day as Inovio’s 
intraday-high record—Citron Research released a statement on social media: “[@Inovio] 
SEC should immediately HALT this stock and investigate the ludicrous and dangerous 
claim that they designed a vaccine in 3 hours.  This has been a serial stock promotion for 
years.  This will trade back to $2.  Investors have been warned.”107
The day after Citron Research’s Twitter statement, Inovio’s share price dropped 
from $18.72 to $9.83 per share.108 This drop represented a 71% decline from the share-
class-period high and a $643 million loss of market capitalization.109 After the Citron 
Research statement, Inovio allegedly attempted damage control by qualifying its previous 
statements as not actually having created a vaccine, but having designed a “vaccine 
construct.”110
Plaintiff shareholders filed their securities class action lawsuit alleging that Inovio 
and its CEO, J. Joseph Kim, “falsely described their product as a fully completed vaccine 
when it was nothing of the sort.”111 The defendants “falsely claimed they had developed 
the vaccine in a matter of hours which is a scientific impossibility.”112 The defendants also 
“falsely state[d] that they would be able to begin human trials in April 2020 when they had 
no reason to believe that they would have the necessary regulatory approvals to do so.”113
Plaintiffs alleged corporations and executives have used COVID-19 as an 
opportunity to portray themselves as positioned to take advantage of the outbreak or as 
positioned to prosper because of the outbreak.114 Despite the lack of precedent for D&O 
liability during pandemic-induced economic downturns, the post-pandemic American 
judicial system will likely become overwhelmed by shareholders who experienced 
102. Id.
 103. Complaint, McDermid, No. 2:20-cv-01402-GJP. 
104. Id. at 6. 
105. Id.
106. Id. at 4. 
 107. @CitronResearch, TWITTER (Mar. 9, 2020, 9:38 AM), 
https://twitter.com/CitronResearch/status/1237025059056709632. 
 108. Complaint at 4, McDermid, No. 2:20-cv-01402-GJP. 
109. Id.
110. Id. To analogize, Inovio’s statement is like saying it built a house and then later stating it only meant that 
it had the blueprints designed.  
111. Id. at 7. 
112. Id.
 113. Complaint at 7, McDermid, No. 2:20-cv-01402-GJP. 
114. See id.
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substantial losses during the 2020 stock market crash.  
C. Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Litigation and Defenses. 
Norwegian’s and Inovio’s corporate misstatements and fraudulent behavior are 
alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.115 The Plaintiffs in these 
securities class action lawsuits alleged that corporate executives blatantly misled their 
investors and artificially inflated stock prices.116 Specifically, Norwegian and Inovio are 
alleged to have violated Section 10(b) (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 which states: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they were made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as 
a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.117
Additionally, the directors and officers are alleged to be liable in their individual 
capacities under Section 20(a) (15 U.S.C. § 78t(a)) which states: 
Joint and several liability; good faith defense. Every person who, directly or indirectly, 
controls any person liable under any provision of this chapter [15 U.S.C.S. §§ 78a et seq.] or 
of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally with and to the 
same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such controlled person is liable 
(including to the Commission in any action brought under paragraph (1) or (3) of 
section 78u(d) of this title), unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not 
directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.118
At first blush, securities lawsuits against corporate directors and officers for 
COVID-19-related misconduct may appear to be plaintiff’s verdict cases. In reality, D&O 
defendants have strong defenses to refute the presumed nexus of alleged corporate 
misconduct and shareholder losses.119 The number of strong defenses are due largely to 
the pandemic’s overall devastation to the American economy.120 COVID-19 will 
undoubtedly cause a record-setting recession and the totality of its impact is not yet 
recognized.121 Simply put, the American economy went “[f]rom full throttle to sudden 
 115. See id.; Complaint, Douglas, No. 1:20-cv-21107. 
116. See sources cited supra note 115.  
 117. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 118. 15 U.S.C. 78t(a). 
 119. See Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Univ. of Georgia Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 288 Ga. App. 355, 654 S.E.2d 207 
(2007). 
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stop” according to Wells Fargo economists.122
COVID-19 caused the history’s largest point crash for the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average on March 9, 2020—one week later, it did it again.123 The Dow hit a record 
2,997.10 loss on March 16, 2020, beating even the 1929 Black Monday record low.124
The downward spiral caused by COVID-19 fears continued worsening as global fears of 
the virus heightened, businesses shut down, and oil prices plummeted.125
As a result, D&O defendants must heavily focus their litigation strategy on loss 
causation. By a preponderance of the evidence, plaintiff shareholders must prove their 
share losses came as a direct result of the D&O’s misrepresentations or fraudulent 
behavior. The extrinsic circumstances of the American economy make this a nearly 
impossible burden to prove. In an economy where there are significant domestic and 
international travel bans in place, the stock market broke record lows twice in one week, 
national agricultural production is at an all-time low, the oil and gas industry is on the 
brink of bankruptcy, and over twenty-six (26) million Americans are unemployed, a 
plaintiff is unlikely to prove that corporate executives’ conduct was the absolute cause of
their share loss. Defendants will successfully raise doubt as to a plaintiff shareholder’s 
securities claims by arguing that a pandemic American economy caused the stock market 
to crash. Whether D&O misconduct or omissions occurred or not, the outcome is the same.  
Further, D&O defendants must litigate aggressively that the timeline of events 
surrounding the share loss alone is not enough for liability. Basically, the fact that share 
prices dropped only after ‘the truth’ of D&O wrongdoing became public is not enough to 
prove the losses resulted from such conduct. The courts have long held that the sequence 
of events leading to share losses does not satisfy causation.126 For example, the Supreme 
Court case Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo involves a group of people who purchased stock 
from Dura Pharmaceuticals between April 15, 1997, and February 24, 1998 
(“Respondents”).127 Respondents brought a securities fraud class action against Dura 
Pharmaceuticals and some of its managers and directors (“Dura”).128 Respondents 
claimed: (1) Dura made false statements regarding profits; (2) Dura falsely claimed the 
Food & Drug Administration (“FDA”) would soon approve an asthmatic spray device; (3) 
Dura stated in February 1998 that sales would be low; (4) Dura announced eight months 
later that the FDA would not approve the spray device; and (5) Dura’s stock dropped in 
value the next day and recovered within a week.129 Most importantly, Respondents 
claimed they had paid an inflated price for stock and thereby suffered damages.130
The District Court dismissed the complaint holding it failed to allege loss causation 
122. Id.
 123. Kimberly Amadeo, How Does the 2020 Stock Market Crash Compare With Others?, THE BALANCE (last 
updated Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.thebalance.com/fundamentals-of-the-2020-market-crash-4799950. 
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
127. Id. at 339. 
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 340. 
14
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 56 [2020], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol56/iss2/4
2021] LITIGATING AN INVISIBLE ENEMY 183 
adequately.131 However, the Ninth Circuit reversed in part the spray device claim holding 
Respondents had adequately alleged loss causation. The Ninth Circuit reasoned: “plaintiffs 
establish loss causation if they have shown that the price on the date of purchase was 
inflated because of the misrepresentation.”132 The Supreme Court granted certiorari since 
the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning was different from other Circuits’ holdings. The Supreme 
Court stated that, to adequately plead a Section 10(b) claim “involving publicly traded 
securities and purchases or sales in public securities markets,” a plaintiff must sufficiently 
plead: 
(1) a material misrepresentation (or omission) . . . (2) scienter, i.e., a wrongful state of mind 
. . . ; (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security . . . ; (4) reliance, often referred 
to in cases involving public securities markets (fraud-on-the-market cases) as “transaction 
causation . . . (5) economic loss . . . and (6) “loss causation,” i.e., a causal connection 
between the material misrepresentation and the loss. . . .133
The Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning and claimed it is simply 
“wrong.”134 The Supreme Court reasoned there is no suffered loss since the ownership of 
a share offsets the inflated purchase. In fact, shares are usually purchased with the mindset 
of selling at a later date; and if the shares were sold before the FDA news came out, there 
would be no loss.135 Furthermore, if sold at a loss at a later date, the loss may not be 
directly attributable to the misrepresentation but due to other reasons.136 For example, a 
change in “economic circumstances, altered investor expectations, new industry-specific 
or firm-specific facts, conditions, or other events”  considered separately or as a whole 
may have changed the prices.137 The Supreme Court  opines that, although the securities 
statute is in place to maintain public confidence in the marketplace, it is “not to provide 
investors with broad insurance against market losses.”138
Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995 (“PSLR”) contends that securities fraud complaints must “specify” every 
misleading statement with all facts “on which that belief” was “formed” and “state with 
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the 
required state of mind.”139 Although the Supreme Court accepts that the pleading rules are 
not in place to inflict a great burden on a plaintiff, the rules do not allow “a plaintiff to 
forgo giving any indication of the economic loss and proximate cause that the plaintiff has 
in mind would bring about harm.”140 Respondents’ Complaint failed because merely 
alleging that Dura’s share price dropped after the truth came out is insufficient alone to 
prove causation for the price inflation.141 Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth 
131. Dura Pharms, Inc., 544 U.S. at 340. 
132. Id.
133. Id. at 341 (emphasis added). 
134. Id. at 342. 
135. Id.
136. Dura Pharms, Inc., 544 U.S. at 343. 
137. Id.
138. Id. at 345 (emphasis added). 
139. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4). 
140. Id. at 347. 
141. Dura Pharms., 544 U.S. at 347. 
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Circuit’s judgment.142
This case applies directly to SEC litigation where plaintiffs claim a plunge in stock 
market prices was due to alleged misrepresentation of directors and officers. 
Consequently, D&O defendants have an advantage in COVID-19 litigation as loss 
causation will be nearly impossible for a plaintiff shareholder to prove in a securities class 
action lawsuit. 
IV. BUSINESS NEGLIGENCE RESULTING IN THIRD-PARTY BODILY INJURY AND HARM
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (“OSH Act”) defines a safe 
workplace as being “free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause 
death or serious physical harm” to employees.143 The United States saw thousands of 
work-related deaths leading up to the enactment of the OSH Act.144 The majority of these 
deaths were from the manual labor workforce who contributed to the coal mining, factory, 
and steel industries.145 The legislative intent behind the OSH Act was to regulate high-
risk-job industries to prevent or minimize on-the-job injuries and illnesses from negligent 
business practices.146 With that understanding in mind, the relevant questions at hand are 
what constitutes a ‘safe work environment’ during times of a pandemic and whether 
businesses recognized and negated COVID-19 work-related hazards? These questions are 
currently the center of COVID-19 employer negligence claims across the country.147
A. Negligence Torts in Business Practice. 
Many employers who kept operations running during the early days of the pandemic 
have experienced some level of internal or public backlash for their business decisions.148
Much of the criticism stems from allegations that employers negligently placed employees 
and/or customers in situations where they became infected or were at high risk of exposure 
to COVID-19.149
The most highly publicized examples of alleged business negligence during the 
COVID-19 public health crisis are the claims against Princess Cruise Lines 
(“Princess”).150 Princess first received criticism in the early days of the pandemic when it 
continued sailing within Asia despite the continent’s mounting health concerns.151
142. Id.
 143. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1970). 
 144. Judson MacLaury, The Job Safety of 1970: Its Passage Was Perilous, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
https://www.dol.gov/general/abogutdol/history/osha (last visited May 7, 2020).  
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. See, e.g., Jay Barmann, Grand Princess Passengers Sue Cruise Line For Negligence, SFIST (Apr. 9, 
2020), https://sfist.com/2020/04/09/nine-grand-princess-cruise-passengers-are-suing-cruise-line-for-
negligence/; Vin Gurrieri, Ex-Walmart Worker’s Death Spurs ‘First’ Ill. COVID Death Suit, LAW360 (Apr. 6, 
2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1260853/ex-walmart-worker-s-death-spurs-first-ill-covid-death-suit; 
Complaint, Dalton, et al. v. Princess Cruise Lines Ltd., No. 2:20-cv-02458 (C.D. Cal. 2020).  
148. See, e.g., Joshua Espinoza, Whole Foods Gets Backlash for Reportedly Recommending Employees 
Donate Their PTO During Coronavirus, COMPLEX (Mar. 13, 2020), https://sfist.com/2020/04/09/nine-grand-
princess-cruise-passengers-are-suing-cruise-line-for-negligence. 
149. See, e.g., id.; Gurrieri, supra note 147.  
 150. Complaint, Dalton, No. 2:20-cv-02458. 
151. See generally id.
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Specifically, seven (7) notable lawsuits are pending against Princess in which passengers 
have alleged the company “failed to implement proper screening procedures and took a 
‘lackadaisical approach’ to customer safety.”152 According to Plaintiffs, these accusations 
came after Princess proceeded with a voyage on February 21, 2020, “despite knowing that 
two passengers who disembarked the ship from a prior voyage had COVID-19 
symptoms.”153 In addition, Plaintiffs accused the company of failing to inform passengers 
that “sixty-two passengers and crew [members] who were previously onboard with the 
passengers who experienced the COVID-19 symptoms were also on board with 
[P]laintiffs.”154 Collectively, Plaintiffs accused the cruise company of breaching its duty 
of care in that it had knowledge of the prior passengers’ symptoms and failed to inform 
and protect Plaintiffs from “exposure to the risk of immediate physical injury” which 
caused “emotional distress and trauma from fear of contracting the virus.”155
Similarly, Walmart has been sued for negligence over the death of a COVID-19-
infected employee.156 Walmart allegedly failed to exercise reasonable care to keep its store 
as follows: 
. . . in a safe and healthy environment and, in particular, to protect employees, customers and 
other individuals within the store from contracting COVID-19 when it knew or should have 
known that individuals at the store were at a very high risk of infection and exposure due to 
the high volume of individuals present at and circulating throughout the store on a daily 
basis.157
Plaintiff further states that store management failed to properly clean and sterilize 
the premises, provide adequate protective gear to employees, or enforce social distancing 
recommendations.158 The lawsuit alleges that, “[a]s a direct and proximate cause of the 
above acts and/or omissions of negligence, the decedent was infected by COVID-19 and 
ultimately died due to complications of COVID-19.”159
In another case, Smithfield Foods, Inc. (“Smithfield”) has denied it was negligent 
after several of its Missouri meatpacking employees tested positive for COVID-19.160
Plaintiffs allege they were forced to worked in close proximity to one another, were denied 
access to proper protective equipment, and were not allowed to exercise proper social 
 152. Donna Higgins, Roundup: First COVID-19 suits filed; states and feds weigh legislation, 25 No. 10 
WESTLAW J. HEALTH CARE FRAUD 02 (Apr. 9, 2020); Complaint, Austin, et al. v. Princess Cruise Lines Ltd., 
No. 20-cv-2531, 2020 WL 1282232 (C.D. Cal. 2020); Complaint, Sheedy, et al. v. Princess Cruise Lines Ltd., 
No. 20-cv-2430, 2020 WL 1231185 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2020); Abitbol, et al. v. Princess Cruise Lines Ltd., No. 
20-cv-2414, complaint filed, 2020 WL 1231198 (C.D. Cal. 2020); Complaint, Kurivial, et al. v. Princess Cruise 
Lines Ltd., No. 20-cv-2361 (C.D. Cal. 2020); Complaint, Gleason, et al. v. Princess Cruise Lines Ltd., No. 20-
cv-2328 (C.D. Cal 2020). 








 160. Complaint at 3, Rural Cmty. Workers All., et al. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., et al., No. 5:20-cv-06063 
(W.D. Mo. dismissed May 5, 2020). 
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hygiene practices during work hours.161 Plaintiffs claim that multiple employees 
contracted the virus while working at the meatpacking plant and became ill due to 
Smithfield’s acts and/or omissions.162
B. Causation Is Likely Difficult to Satisfy. 
To successfully argue negligence, a plaintiff must show that a defendant had a “duty 
of care, breached that duty, and that the damages were proximately caused by the 
breach.”163 Defendants such as Princess Cruise Lines, Walmart, and Smithfield must focus 
their defense heavily on the aspect of proximate cause. Proximate cause has two 
components: foreseeability and cause in fact.164 Defendants will likely succeed on a 
motion for summary judgment or at trial arguing that the plaintiff could not prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that “(i) the negligence was a substantial factor in bringing 
about the harm and (ii) absent the negligence, the harm would not have occurred”—
commonly referred to as the “but for” test.165
Defendant employers must litigate that the plaintiff cannot make a proximate cause 
showing because the array of community exposures to the virus creates irrefutable 
reasonable doubt.166 As such, pinpointing a specific instance or event which caused a 
person to contract the virus will prove not just extremely challenging, but likely 
impossible. Not every person who becomes infected will show symptoms; and even if they 
do, it may remain unclear as to how or where a claimant was exposed.167 Thus, it is 
difficult to show that an employer negligently failed to keep employees “free from 
recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm” 
under the OSH Act. 
Further, employers must litigate COVID-19 negligence claims on the credibility of 
the witnesses testifying as to the transmission of the disease. COVID-19, like the Ebola 
virus and other infectious diseases, “involve[s] matters beyond the common understanding 
161. Id. at 13–14. 
162. Id. at 18. 
 163. Texas Health Res., et al. v. Pham, No. 05-15-01283-CV, 2016 WL 4205732, at *4 (Tex. App. Aug. 3, 
2016) (“The elements of negligence are a duty, a breach of that duty, and damages proximately caused by the 
breach.”). 
 164. CDC, How COVID-19 Spreads, https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/how-
covid-spreads.html?CDC_AA_refVal=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cdc.gov%2Fcoronavirus%2F2019-
ncov%2Fprepare%2Ftransmission.html (last visited May 7, 2020) (“The virus that causes COVID-19 is 
spreading very easily and sustainably between people. Information from the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic 
suggests that this virus is spreading more efficiently than influenza, but not as efficiently as measles, which is 
highly contagious.”). 
165. Texas Health Res., 2016 WL 4205732, at *4; Mayer v. Willowbrook Plaza Ltd. P’ship, 278 S.W.3d 901 
(Tex. App. 2009); Am. Indus. Life Ins. Co. v. Ruvalcaba, 64 S.W.3d 126, 134 (Tex. App. petition denied 2001)
(“An invitee enters land with the owner’s knowledge and for the mutual benefit of both.”); see CMH Homes, 
Inc. v. Daenen, 15 S.W.3d 97, 101 (Tex. 2000); see also Brown v. Nicholson, 1997 OK 32, 935 P.2d 319.  
 166. See generally, CDC, Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19): Guidance Documents,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/communication/guidance-list.html?Sort=Date%3A%3Adesc (last 
updated Aug. 27, 2020).  
167. See Guidance for Businesses and Employers Responding to Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19), CDC,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/guidance-business-response.html (last update Jan. 24, 
2021).  
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of the ordinary lay person, [and thus, causation] must be proved by expert testimony.”168
In Texas Health Resources v. Pham, the Texas Court of Appeals in Dallas concluded that 
the “likelihood of transmitting the Ebola virus, assuming different policies and the use of 
different protective equipment, is beyond a lay person’s common understanding.”169
Courts should make a similar finding that the likelihood of transmitting COVID-19 
through contact tracing is beyond a lay person’s common understanding and will also need 
to be proved by expert testimony.170 After all, “[m]ere lay testimony about causation 
cannot establish that a claimant has a probable right of recovery.”171 Thus, absent expert 
testimony that can arguably establish specific causation, employers will likely prevail 
against negligence claims made by plaintiffs.  
C. Defending Against Workers’ Compensation Claims.
Under a workers’ compensation claim, an infected employee may seek 
compensation through an alternative court or administrative system than those described 
above. Employees will argue their claims are valid for workers’ compensation because 
they were injured by COVID-19 within the course and scope of their employment. A valid 
workers’ compensation claim depends on whether the injury occurred at work and will 
most likely apply in scenarios where an employee is required to work during quarantine, 
travel to high-risk locations, or return to work after the initial reopening of the business.172
In most jurisdictions, workers’ compensation statutes provide that benefits are the 
exclusive remedy for on-the-job injuries. Because the virus is not an “injury,” many 
jurisdictions have the responsibility to determine if the virus is an “occupational disease” 
which generally requires:  
1. The illness to have arisen out of and in the course of employment; and 
2. The illness to have arisen out of or been caused by conditions peculiar to the work. 
Workers’ compensation immunity is a significant hurdle for employees or their 
estates to overcome when filing suit against an employer. While workers’ compensation 
immunity is jurisdiction-specific, it typically bars any separate lawsuit against the 
employer for an injury an employee suffers at work, especially those resulting from 
negligence. However, there are very limited exceptions to workers’ compensation 
immunity—again, depending on the applicable state law. 
As is the case in the civil claims described above, plaintiffs seeking workers’ 
compensation benefits will also face an uphill battle to prove causation. The airborne 
infectious nature of the coronavirus will prove extremely difficult for workers to establish 
how, when, or where they were exposed to the virus, which may ultimately bar their 
168. See Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 583 (Tex. 2006) (citing Texas Health Res., 2016 WL 
4205732, at 5); see also Gharda USA, Inc. v. Control Solutions, Inc., 464 S.W.3d 338, 348 (Tex. 2015) (cited by 
Texas Health Res., 2016 WL 4205732, at *5 (Tex. App. Aug. 3, 2016)). 
169. Texas Health Res., 2016 WL 4205732, at *5. 
170. Id.
171. Id. at *6. 
 172. PRACTICAL LAW COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS, WESTLAW, INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR COVID-19
LOSSES CHART, PRACTICAL LAW CHECKLIST (available at Westlaw W-024-5319).  
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claims. On the other hand, public safety workers enjoy a presumption that their exposure 
to a disease like COVID-19 is generally connected to their employment.173
Texas Governor Greg Abbott suspended Texas Government Code §§ 607.002 (1) 
and (2) to facilitate public safety workers “who were likely to have been exposed to 
COVID-19 while in the course of their employment, to be entitled to the 
reimbursements.”174 A gray area that employers must litigate strongly against are claims 
made by workers who are deemed “essential” during the pandemic.175 Unlike public safety 
workers, essential workers do not enjoy the presumption that COVID-19-related injuries 
are connected to their employment. As such, “essential” workers who continued working 
during the pandemic will have a difficult time proving that their employment caused their 
exposure to the virus.   
Additionally, defendant employers should look at their specific workers’ 
compensation policy language for virus-related exclusions. Commonly, workers’ 
compensation policies contain exclusionary language for the “ordinary diseases of life.” 
Employers should argue that a pandemic is a “force majeure” or “act of God” and that the 
health and environmental threats of COVID-19 are a natural occurrence seen many times 
throughout the course of humanity.176 Therefore, an employer must argue that, because 
the coronavirus pandemic was not a result of business-related negligence and was a 
naturally-occurring event, employees are not entitled to compensation under workers’ 
compensation claims. 
D. The Argument for Immunity. 
Legislatures and governors are considering providing businesses with full immunity 
against employer-related negligence claims relating to the transmission or infection of 
COVID-19.177 Immunity from negligence claims would instill a greater sense of security 
and confidence to restart the American economy. However, a full immunity solution may 
unjustly frustrate the path to legal recourse available to employees and customers with 
legitimate claims against businesses for violation of their common law duties; it may also 
disincentivize employers from the rigorous implementation of apposite safety precautions. 
Ultimately, many costs of such an alternative may reside with federal, state, and 
local governments in the form of increased Medicaid expenditures, free care, and other 
social welfare protections for the victims of COVID-19 contracted in a commercial setting. 
To calm concerns that businesses may not follow all precautionary measures if granted 
173. See, e.g., Letter from Cassie Brown, Comm’r Workers’ Comp., Tex. Dep’t Ins., to Tex. Workers’ Comp. 
Sys. Participants (Mar. 30, 2020) (on file with Tex. Dep’t Ins.). 
174. Id.
 175. Press Release, OFF. TEX. GOVERNOR GREG ABBOTT, Governor Abbot Issues Executive Order, 
Implements Statewide Essential Services And Activities Protocols (Mar. 31, 2020) (on file with author) 
(“Essential services shall consist of everything listed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in its 
Guidance on the Essential Critical Infrastructure Workforce, Version 2.0, plus religious services conducted in 
churches, congregations, and houses of worship.”).  
 176. E.g., Spanish Flu of 1918, Hong Kong Flu of 1968, and H1N1 of 2009. 
177. See, e.g., David Morgan, Corporate America seeks legal protection for when coronavirus lockdown lift, 
REUTERS (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-usa-liability/corporate-
america-seeks-legal-protection-for-when-coronavirus-lockdowns-lift-idUSKCN223179. This immunity would 
exclude claims against an employer for gross negligence or willful misconduct. 
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complete immunity, there is an alternative compromise of government-granted qualified 
immunity. Qualified immunity may apply to businesses which meet specific precautionary 
standards criteria. The criteria would directly relate to the precautionary countermeasures 
to COVID-19, including compliance with  the Center for Disease Control and Prevention 
(“CDC”) and state virus control guidelines.178Therefore, the qualified immunity option 
would not only provide complete immunity for compliant businesses, but would also 
provide a pathway for workers and patrons of businesses to pursue legal remedies for 
COVID-19 transmission where a business fails to comply with required precautionary 
standards. 
Governments could further limit business liability by developing targeted immunity 
policies which would provide immunity only to those businesses where employees and 
patrons necessarily face a heightened risk of contracting COVID-19, namely, healthcare 
providers. Several states have already taken such steps including New York, 
Massachusetts, Illinois, and Arizona. These targeted protections insulate those businesses 
most likely to face COVID-19-related claims, but also run the risk of creating disincentives 
to take the maximum level of precautions. However, to alleviate such concerns, targeted 
immunity could be conditioned upon a business’s adherence to safety and sanitation 
guidelines and could carve out exceptions from liability for willful misconduct or gross 
negligence. 
V. EMPLOYEE DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION
More than twenty-six (26) million Americans lost their employment as a result of 
the United States’ economic shutdown during the coronavirus pandemic.179 In all 
likelihood, it will be many years, or even decades, before the damage COVID-19 has 
caused on the American workforce is fully realized. As nearly a decade’s worth of 
employment gains disappeared during the first several weeks of the pandemic, the United 
States’ job loss is on track with numbers during the Great Depression.180 Foreseeably, the 
American judicial system will see an influx of claims by furloughed and terminated 
employees who feel that their termination was not strictly for economic reasons, but also 
for retaliatory or discriminatory ones. With this in mind, it is vital that employers 
understand the changes governing anti-discrimination legislation and the interrelationship 
of applicable federal and state laws that regulate the private business sector. 
A.  Pandemic-related Impact on Longstanding Federal Laws and Regulations. 
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) enforces federal 
anti-discrimination laws which are enumerated in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, OSH 
Act, Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Rehabilitation Act, Age Discrimination in 
 178. E.g., the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, etc. 
 179. Jeffry Bartash, Jobless claims jump another 4.4 million – 26 million Americans have lost their jobs to the 
coronavirus, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/jobless-claims-jump-
another-44-million-25-million-americans-have-lost-their-jobs-to-the-coronavirus-2020-04-23. 
 180. Heather Long, U.S. now has 22 million unemployed, wiping out a decade of job gains, WASH. POST (Apr. 
16, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/04/16/unemployment-claims-coronavirus/. 
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Employment Act, and Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act.181 Anti-discrimination 
laws require employers to provide a safe work environment without discriminating against  
employees based on their disability or protected-class status. The pandemic has at least 
partially blurred the legal boundaries between employer responsibilities and employee 
privacy in their traditional application. What exactly constitutes a disability and actionable 
discrimination in the COVID-19 era is the debate shaping the next decade of employment 
law litigation. 
Perhaps the most obvious defense to wrongful termination or retaliation claims 
would be that the layoff was not a result of discrimination but occurred due to the 
business’s economic hardships during the pandemic. It will likely be difficult to prove 
business interruption losses did not facilitate the need to furlough or terminate employees 
without additional evidence of targeted termination or discriminatory behavior. 
Traditionally, an employee has the right to refuse to disclose personal medical 
information to his or her employer. If the business owner subsequently fires the employee 
for this refusal, then the employee has evidence of retaliation and wrongful termination. 
Yet in the 2020 pandemic era, the EEOC has announced this is not the case with COVID-
19-related medical inquiries. Employers have a strong defense against wrongful 
termination claims when an employee refuses to cooperate in the employer’s medical 
screening protocols. The EEOC has adopted the CDC’s guidelines for workplace 
mitigation as legal authority for employers.182
For example, an employer may defend itself against a wrongful termination claim 
from an ill employee who refuses to provide pertinent medical information or be medically 
screened when coming back to work.183 During a pandemic, employers must mitigate 
COVID-19 workplace health concerns as outlined by the EEOC, ADA and CDC.184 As 
long as there is an active threat of the spread of  infection, ADA-covered employers have 
the right to ask employees for personal medical information when they take sick days off 
from work.185 Employees must disclose to an employer if they are experiencing symptoms 
of the pandemic virus such as a fever, cough, shortness of breath, etc.186 If the employee 
refuses to disclose such information, there are grounds for termination without grounds for 
discrimination or retaliation.187
Additionally, employees who refuse to cooperate in workplace screening and safety 
protocols will likely forfeit their claims for wrongful termination or retaliation. During the 
COVID-19 pandemic, employers are allowed to medically screen employees by way of 
temperature checks, enforcement of proper hygiene practices, and social distancing in the 
 181. What You Should Know About the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act and the Coronavirus, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
OPP. COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/wysk_ada_rehabilitaion_act_coronavirus.cfm (last 
visited May 7, 2020). 
 182. Id. (“The EEO laws, including the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, continue to apply during the time of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, but they do not interfere with or prevent employers from following [CDC guidelines].”)
183. See generally id.
184. See Business & Workplaces subsection of Coronavirus Disease 2019, CDC, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/organizations/businesses-employers.html (last updated 
May 7, 2020).  
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workplace.188 Employees who refuse to participate in the employer’s reasonable safety 
precautions will give cause for termination.189 For instance, an employee who calls into 
work sick on a Friday and comes back to the office on Monday cannot refuse to answer 
the employer’s reasonable questions about his or her illness or current symptoms.190 The 
employee also cannot refuse a temperature check or an order to socially distance from 
other employees or to leave the business until he or she is tested for the virus.191 The ADA 
permits mandatory testing by employers as a workplace mitigation strategy because 
infected employees reentering the workplace are a direct threat to the health of their 
coworkers.192 As such, employers can legally terminate an employee who refuses to 
participate in mandatory COVID-19 testing at the workplace on the grounds that the 
medical testing was “job related and consistent with business necessity.”193   
Another major COVID-19-related change to longstanding federal 
anti-discrimination law is an employer’s level of obligation to provide disabled employees 
with work-related accommodations.194 Prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, it was held that 
the majority of accommodations for disabled employees were reasonable and affordable 
within the business’s overall resources and budget.195 The pandemic’s economic impact 
on the United States has left many employers with significant difficulty or the inability to 
provide employees with many requested accommodations.196 ADA guidelines now allow 
for COVID-19-related undue hardship considerations for employers rejecting the requests 
of a disabled employee.197 For example, a vision-impaired employee who is teleworking 
due to the pandemic may not be granted a request for custom computer screens that are 
significantly more expensive than traditional monitors if the additional expense creates an 
undue hardship on the financially-strapped employer. It is the employer’s duty to work 
with the employee on reasonable alternatives to his or her request, but it is understood that 
financial constraints in times of crisis are reasonable grounds for denial of some requested 
accommodations without triggering discrimination.198
Overall, federal anti-discrimination laws have expanded the employer’s powers to 
control and protect its workforce during the pandemic.199 Employers have the power to 
require that employees wear protective gear and follow CDC-approved infection-control 
practices and terminate those who refuse to comply with reasonable COVID-19 safety 
measures.200 The ADA also permits employers to make disability-related inquiries and 
188. Id.
189. Id.
 190. What you should know, supra note 181. 
191. Id. The only exception to these requirements being if the employer was requesting a disabled employee 
to take precautions that were impossible to follow due to their disability (e.g., an employee with a latex allergy 









 200. What you should know, supra note 181. The caveat being that reasonable accommodations must be 
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conduct medical exams if there is a direct threat to an employee’s health based on the 
available objective medical evidence.201 Even with the additional authority given to 
employers during the pandemic, there must be careful consideration as to what measures 
constitute reasonable workplace safety measures and unlawful disparate employee 
treatment based on protected-class physiognomies.202 The distinction in treatment will 
ultimately determine an employer’s success in litigation. 
B. Federal and State Law Interrelationships. 
The average American is typically familiar with constitutional rights and federal 
laws which govern employee discrimination actions. As discussed in the section above, 
federal rules and regulations have adapted in consideration of a virus-produced national 
crisis. While pandemic considerations are paramount in discrimination and retaliation 
litigation, it is necessary to understand specific state laws which interrelate to federal 
employment legislation.   
Many states have adopted their own disability discrimination acts to supplement the 
ADA.203 Some states refer to this legislation as their “Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act” 
(“HCRA”) or some variation of the name.204 The state of Michigan has signed into law its 
own HCRA which reads, in part, “[An employer shall not] discharge or otherwise 
discriminate against an individual with respect to compensation or the terms, conditions, 
or privileges of employment, because of a handicap that is unrelated to the individual’s 
ability to perform the duties of a particular job or position.”205
For an employee to successfully prove a prima facie case of discrimination against 
his or her employer under Michigan’s HCRA, it must be established that: (1) the plaintiff 
is “handicapped” as defined in the HCRA, (2) the handicap is unrelated to the plaintiff’s 
ability to perform the duties of a particular job, and (3) the plaintiff has been discriminated 
against in one of the ways set forth in the statute.206
Additionally, states across the country have adopted into their public health codes 
several federally based regulations which govern private sector industries. Depending 
upon the transmittable nature of the disease, an employee may be subject to lawful 
termination depending on his or her infection status. For example, the Michigan 
Department of Public Health adopted and incorporated the United States Public Health 
Service transmittable disease regulation which reads, in part: 
No person, while infected with a disease in a communicable form that can be transmitted by 
foods or who is a carrier of organisms that can cause such a disease or while afflicted with a 
boil, an infected wound, or an acute respiratory infection, shall work in a food service 
establishment in any capacity in which there is a likelihood of such person contaminating 
performed for disabled or protected class employees. For example, modified face masks for interpreters or others 
who directly communicate with a hearing-impaired employee who reads lips or modified rules based on an 
employee’s religious restrictions or beliefs. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.1202(1)(b) (2020). 
 204. See, e.g., id.
205. Id.
206. Merillat v. Mich. State Univ., 523 N.W.2d 802 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994). 
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food or food-contact surfaces with pathogenic organisms or transmitting disease to other 
persons. 207
Further, Michigan law authorizes in pertinent part: 
(1) If the department or a local health department has reasonable cause to suspect possible 
disease transmission by an employee of a food service establishment, it may secure a 
morbidity history of the suspected employee and make any other investigation as may be 
deemed necessary. 
(2) The department or a local health department may order an owner, operator, or person in 
charge of a food service establishment to do any of the following if a communicable disease 
is suspected or confirmed: 
(a) Immediately exclude the employee from working in the food service establishment. 
      * * * 
(c) Restrict the employee’s service to some area of the food service establishment, as 
approved by the department or the local health department, where there is no danger of 
transmitting disease. 
(d) Require or provide for adequate medical or laboratory examination of the employee and 
other employees and of their body discharges. 
(3) The owner, operator, or person in charge of a food service establishment shall exclude 
from the food service establishment any employee with a suspected communicable 
disease.208
When this state regulation is applied during the coronavirus pandemic, a restaurant 
or food service employer must prohibit all coronavirus-infected employees from working 
in any capacity in which they may handle food or come into contact with surfaces or 
objects which may touch food.209 In essence, the Michigan Public Health Code authorizes 
an employer or health department to lawfully discriminate against an employee who has 
or is reasonably suspected of having COVID-19 or another contagious disease that may 
be transmitted through contact with food or surfaces.210 Additionally, this provision does 
not trigger employee protection under Section 202(1)(b) of Michigan’s HCRA because the 
virus or “handicap” directly interferes with the employee’s ability to perform the duties 
specific to that employment. 211
For the strongest defense against COVID-19 employee discrimination claims, a 
business owner’s legal counsel must be well versed in the state-specific adoptions and 
legislation governing their specific business sector. Proper knowledge of federal and state 
law interrelationships may dramatically impact the probability of a successful defense 
verdict in the courtroom.  
 207. Pursuant to § 12909(1) of the Michigan Public Health Code, the Michigan Department of Public Health 
adopted and incorporated within its rules the provisions of the 1976 recommendations of the United States Public 
Health Service, found in the publication entitled “Food Service Sanitation Manual.” 1981 AACS, R 
325.25103(b), provision adopted is § 3-101. 
 208. 1981 AACS, R 325.25909(3). 
 209. Pursuant to § 12909(1) of the Michigan Public Health Code, the Michigan Department of Public Health 
adopted and incorporated within its rules the provisions of the 1976 recommendations of the United States Public 
Health Service found in the publication entitled “Food Service Sanitation Manual.” 1981 AACS, R 325.25103(b), 
provision adopted is § 3-101. 
210. See generally id.
 211. Id.
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VI. NURSING HOME NEGLIGENCE AND WRONGFUL DEATH
A difficult aspect of COVID-19 insurance defense will, without a doubt, be litigating 
claims involving the loss of life. Tragically, elderly Americans living in long term care 
facilities, such as nursing homes, are among the most vulnerable to the disease.212 The 
CDC reports that over eighty percent (80%) of coronavirus deaths are among adults over 
the age of sixty-five (65).213 More than twenty-five hundred (2,500) nursing home 
facilities in thirty-six (36) states have reported COVID-19-positive residents due to the 
inability to contain the outbreak.214 This has led to an alarming surge of more than 
seventy-three hundred (7,300) confirmed COVID-19 deaths linked to nursing homes.215
As more adults over the age of sixty-five (65) in the U.S. have now died of COVID-19 
than were killed in the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, it is fair to say that the 
memory of what is ongoing in these nursing facilities will not end with the pandemic.216
Foreseeably, nursing homes will face intense investigations into their compliance 
with all infection and disease prevention and control procedures and professional standards 
of care guidelines. As an estimated seventy-five percent (75%) of long term care facilities 
are actively noncompliant with federal infection and disease control regulations, COVID-
19 loss-of-life litigation will primarily consist of wrongful death and negligence claims 
against nursing home facilities and medical staff.217 Due to the heightened risk for 
emotionally charged, excessive jury verdicts, it is imperative that nursing home defendants 
not only litigate on technical regulatory and legal compliance, but also on the facts and 
reality of providing geriatric healthcare during a pandemic. 
President Trump has implemented the CARES Act, a $2 trillion stimulus package 
that protects volunteer healthcare workers from certain civil liability.218 In addition, 
several state lawmakers are taking steps to protect healthcare providers by providing civil 
medical immunity.219 However, the immunity would not protect nursing homes against 
 212. Suzy Khimm, et al., More than 2,200 coronavirus deaths in nursing homes, but federal government isn’t
tracking them, NBC NEWS (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/more-2-200-coronavirus-
deaths-nursing-homes-federal-government-isn-n1181026.  
 213. CDC COVID-19 Response Team, Severe Outcomes Among Patients with Coronavirus Disease 2019 
(COVID-19)–United States, February 12–March 16, 2020, CDC (Mar. 18, 2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/pdfs/mm6912e2-H.pdf.  
 214. Khimm, supra note 212.  
 215. Matthew Mosk, et al., Inside nursing homes, coronavirus brings isolation and 7,300 deaths; Outside, 
families yearn for news, ABC NEWS (Apr. 19, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/inside-nursing-homes-
coronavirus-brings-isolation-7300-deaths/story?id=70225836.  
 216. The Associated Press, Coronavirus in US: More Americans have died from COVID-19 than in 9/11 
attacks, SYRACUSE (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.syracuse.com/coronavirus/2020/03/coronavirus-in-us-more-
americans-have-died-of-covid-19-than-in-911-attacks.html. 
 217. Danielle Leigh, About 75% of nursing homes cited, violating standards to prevent the spread of disease, 
ABC 7 NY (Mar. 13, 2020), https://abc7ny.com/7-on-your-side-infectious-disease-nursing-home-homes-in-
united-states/6010241/. 
 218. Y. Peter Kang, 6 States With COVID-19 Medical Immunity, And 2 Without, LAW360 (Apr. 17, 2020), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1264964/6-states-with-covid-19-medical-immunity-and-2-without. 
 219. For example, New York, New Jersey, Michigan, Massachusetts, Illinois, and other states have 
implemented some type of immunity for health care providers. Id. Other states, such as Oklahoma, are in the 
process of providing medical immunity. Sarah Jarvis, Oklahoma House Passes COVID-19 Civil Immunity Bill,
LAW360 (May 5, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1270712/oklahoma-house-passes-covid-19-civil-
immunity-bill. 
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civil cases involving claims such as willful, reckless or criminal misconduct or gross 
negligence.220
A. Crisis Standard of Care vs. Longstanding Standard of Care Guidelines. 
Both federal and state laws establish standard of care requirements for an assisted 
living program to classify as a nursing facility.221 Federal regulations require that the 
standard of care for long term care facilities “must establish and maintain an infection 
prevention and control program (“IPCP”) designed to provide a safe, sanitary, and 
comfortable environment and to help prevent the development and transmission of 
222communicable diseases and infections.”  Under 42 C.F.R. § 483.80, the IPCP must 
include several precautionary measures such as: 
i. A system of surveillance designed to identify possible communicable 
diseases or infections before they can spread to other persons in the facility; 
ii. When and to whom possible incidents of communicable diseases or 
infections should be reported; 
iii. Standard and transmission-based precautions to be followed to prevent 
spread of infections; 
iv. When and how isolation should be used for a resident, including but not 
limited to: 
a. The type and duration of the isolation, depending upon the 
infectious agent or organism involved, and 
b. A requirement that the isolation should be the least restrictive 
possible for the resident under the circumstances. 
v. The circumstances under which the facility must prohibit employees with 
a communicable disease or infected skin lesions from direct contact with 
residents or their food, if direct contact will transmit the disease; and 
vi. The hand hygiene procedures to be followed by staff involved in direct 
resident contact. 
In April 2020, the first wrongful death lawsuit against a long term nursing care 
facility was filed in connection to the death of a COVID-19-infected resident.223 In 
Deborah de los Angeles v. Life Care Centers of America Inc. d/b/a Life Care Center of 
Kirkland, et al., Plaintiff, Deborah de los Angeles, alleges that her 85-year-old mother, 
Twilla Morin, was a nursing home resident in Defendant’s Kirkland, Washington, facility 
when she became infected with the virus and ultimately succumbed to the disease.224
Plaintiff contends that the nursing home failed to timely report or control the outbreak of 
220. Id.
221. See, e.g., Moore v. Warr Acres Nursing Ctr., LLC, 376 P.3d 894, 903 (Okla. 2016) (Oklahoma law 
requires that a nursing facility comply with all federal, state, and local laws regarding regulations and professional 
standards of care); 42 C.F.R. § 483.1 (2020). 
222 . 42 C.F.R. §.483.80 (2020). 
 223. Complaint, De los Angeles v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc., et al., No. 20-2-07689-9 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 
2020).  
224. Id. at 2. 
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the contagious respiratory illness that was first documented at the facility on February 10, 
2020.225 The Complaint states that “[a]lthough defendants were on high-alert for COVID-
19 since January 2020, they lacked a clear plan of action leading to a systemic failure.”226
Further, Defendant’s staff are accused of continuing the day-to-day operations of the 
facility in a manner which enabled the virus to thrive in the most vulnerable of 
environments.227 Plaintiff argues that, in February 2020 “[i]nstead of quarantining 
residents and staff, defendants admitted new residents and threw a Mardi Gras party. 
Instead of immediately notifying authorities of a ‘flu’ outbreak, defendants sat on it for 17 
days before reporting anything.”228
Undoubtedly, Plaintiff is arguing negligence and wrongful death liability against the 
nursing home for a breach in the professional standard of care which allegedly resulted in 
the uncontrollable spread of the virus among elderly residents and staff.229 While there is 
a longstanding standard of care framework regulating nursing homes and their personnel, 
it is not without some degree of circumstantial fluidity.230
Dependent upon the facts, Life Care Center of Kirkland’s best defense is likely that 
it was operating under crisis standard of care guidelines during the coronavirus pandemic 
and not simply the longstanding professional standards of care for nursing homes and 
healthcare personnel.231 Crisis standard of care guidelines supplement the traditional rules 
in unorthodox circumstances justifying a substantial change in the level of care it is 
possible to provide.232 Specifically, the American Nurses Association (“ANA”) defines 
“Crisis Standard of Care” as follows:
[A] substantial change in usual healthcare operations and the level of care it is possible to 
deliver, which is made necessary by a pervasive (e.g. pandemic influenza) or catastrophic 
(e.g. earthquake, hurricane) disaster. This change in the level of care delivered is justified by 
specific circumstances and is formally declared by a state government, in recognition that 
crisis operations will be in effect for a sustained period. The formal declaration that crisis 
standards of care are in operation enables specific legal/regulatory powers and protections 
for healthcare providers in the necessary tasks of allocating and using scarce medical 
resources and implementing alternate care facility operations.233
According to the ANA, during “a pandemic, nurses can find themselves operating 
in environments demanding a balance between time-limited crisis standards of care and 
234longstanding professional standards of care.” As such, variances “in the standard of 
care can occur in circumstances when available resources are limited or when a clinician 
225. Id. at 5. 
226. Id. at 2. 
227. Id.
 228. Complaint at 2, De los Angeles, No. 20-2-07689-9 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 2020).  
 229. Id. at 8. 
230. See generally Crisis Standard of Care COVID-19 Pandemic, ANA, 
https://www.nursingworld.org/~496044/globalassets/practiceandpolicy/work-environment/health—
safety/coronavirus/crisis-standards-of-care.pdf (last visited May 9, 2020).  
231. Id. (emphasis added). 
232. Id.
233. Id. (citing IOM Guidance for Establishing Crisis Standards of Care for Use in Disaster Situations, 2012).  
234 . Id.
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235is practicing in an unusual setting or with unfamiliar patient care needs.”  Hospitals, 
nursing homes and medical personnel now “find themselves operating in crisis standards 
236of care environments.” Nursing homes and long term care facilities are given detailed 
guidance on how to operate under crisis standard of care procedures during disaster 
237situations.  Specifically, the guidelines incorporate the following: 
i. A duty to care during crises like pandemics. Employers and supervisors 
have a corresponding duty to reduce risks to nursing staff safety, plan for 
competing priorities like childcare, and address moral distress and other 
injuries to personal and professional integrity such crisis events can cause; 
ii. A specific balance of professional standards and crisis standards of care 
will be based on the reality of the specific situation, such as the presence 
or absence of necessary equipment, medications or colleagues;
iii. Decision-making during extreme conditions can shift ethical standards to a 
utilitarian framework in which the clinical goal is the greatest good for 
the greatest number of individuals, but that shift must not 
disproportionately burden those who already suffer healthcare disparities 
and social injustice; 
iv. Sacrifices in desired care must be fairly shared. This means that care 
decisions are not about “the best that can be done” under normal conditions. 
They are necessarily constrained by the specific conditions during the 
crisis.
v. Registered nurses may be asked to delegate care to others, such as 
students, staff displaced from another institution, or volunteers. This 
will require a rapid assessment of the skills of the others available to assist 
in patient care. Nurses must continue to emphasize patient safety and 
appropriate delegation. 
vi. An increased reliance on a nurse’s own or the collective accumulated 
competence may be needed, as the usual range of colleagues, experts 
or support services may not be available.238
Additionally, institutional crisis standard of care guidelines for the nursing home 
facility’s operation in a major disaster scenario include:
i. Institutions and healthcare systems have a duty to safeguard employees 
with policies and practices that are evidence-based, transparently decided 
and have clear accountabilities; 
ii. In a healthcare system characterized by structural racism, income 
inequality and healthcare disparities, a “first come first served” approach 
may compound existing injustice. Healthcare systems must counter these 
 235. ANA, supra note 230.  
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. (emphasis added). 
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impacts with efforts to protect at-risk populations; 
iii. A range of contingencies must be planned for by accountable 
decisionmakers as demand for care increases and resources, such as staff 
and materials, become scarce; 
iv. Essential decisions about allocation of resources must be made at systems 
and community levels; 
v. The individual registered nurse should remain focused on patients and is 
responsible for giving the best possible care with available resources; 
vi. Decisions at the system level must be: 
a. Fair – Decision-making standards should be recognized as fair by 
all those affected by them. 
b. Equitable – The process used to make decisions about scarce 
resources should be transparent, consistent, proportional to the 
scale of the emergency and degree of scarce resources, and 
accountable for appropriate protections and the just allocation of 
available resources. 
B. Notice Requiring Action. 
Nursing homes are trained and equipped for the prevention and control of diseases 
and infections that commonly afflict elderly residents. Bed sores, staph infections, and the 
flu are all common medical complications requiring the traditional standard of care seen 
within any typical nursing home environment. However, Life Care Center of Kirkland and 
other nursing homes across the country combatted a novel coronavirus that is considerably 
unlike any communal disease ever encountered in the United States.239
During his call for a global plan of action against the disease, United Nations 
Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, regarded the coronavirus pandemic as “the greatest 
test” our world has endured since World War II and a “human crisis” of historical 
proportions.240 COVID-19 stands apart from other commonly contracted viruses in its 
high rate of transmission from non-symptomatic carriers and the speed in which it spreads 
from person to person.241 “In general, when the flu hits you, people lie in bed and don’t 
go out,” said Dr. Simone Wildes, an infectious disease specialist at South Shore Health.242
“But something we are seeing with COVID-19 is that, because the symptoms are mild for 
most of the population, they can go out and spread the disease quite easily, especially given 
how long you can be infectious for.”243
In the Life Care Center of Kirkland case, the nursing home has a strong defense that 
it did not act negligently during the timeframe in which Plaintiff’s mother contracted the 
virus as it was operating within the professional standards of care guidelines and without 
 239. Vinayak Kumar, COVID-19 has been compared to the flu. Experts say that’s wrong, ABC NEWS (Mar. 
27, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/covid-19-compared-flu-experts-wrong/story?id=69779116.  
 240. Darryl Coote, U.N.: COVID-19 is ‘greatest test’ since World War II, UPI (Apr. 1, 2020), 
https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2020/04/01/UN-COVID-19-is-greatest-test-since-World-War-
II/9631585722662/.  
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notice of a national crisis. Plaintiff alleges that the nursing home was on notice of the 
pandemic dangers to its residents since January 2020 and that it negligently failed to take 
preventative measures to quarantine and discontinue patient admissions into the facility in 
February 2020.244 Plaintiff’s argument is weak, as the United States was not on notice of 
a domestic crisis during this timeframe.  It was not until March 13, 2020, that President 
Donald J. Trump declared the coronavirus disease as a national emergency in the United 
States.245 President Trump’s emergency determination came only two (2) days after the 
World Health Organization officially categorized COVID-19 as a global pandemic.246 The 
first statewide stay-at-home “quarantine” order for Washington State was issued by 
Governor Jay Inslee on March 23, 2020.247 Life Care Center of Kirkland has a strong 
defense against the claim that it was negligent in its care from January–February 2020 if 
it operated within the professional standard of care guidelines prior to an official notice of 
the coronavirus pandemic by federal or state authorities. Further, Life Care Center of 
Kirkland should argue that COVID-19 guidelines for long term care facilities and nursing 
homes on coronavirus prevention and control, resident quarantine, symptoms of infection, 
and mandatory reporting of infection rates to the health departments were not released by 
the CDC until April 4, 2020.248
As the events described above unfolded in quick succession, Life Care Center of 
Kirkland and similarly situated defendants must immediately establish a timeline of 
COVID-19 occurrences within their facilities to defend themselves against allegations that 
they failed to act or follow standard of care guidelines. The defendant’s documentation 
should include the date a resident first became symptomatic, actions taken by health care 
personnel, and the progression of the illness over time (e.g., did the nursing home 
resident’s health decline immediately or over the course of several days, were there any 
clear indicators for the necessity of medical intervention, and, if applicable, when the 
patient was transported to a hospital or placed under the care of a medical doctor). Overall, 
a nursing home defendant should not be held legally liable for the death of a COVID-19-
infected resident if the facility’s health care personnel followed the longstanding standard 
of care guidelines for disease prevention and control prior to notice of a national 
emergency and/or before the publication of the CDC’s crisis standard of care 
recommendations for coronavirus disease control.  
 244. Complaint at 1, 3, De los Angeles, No. 20-2-07689-9.  
 245. Letter from Donald J. Trump, U.S. President, to Secretary Wolf, Secretary Mnuchin, Secretary Azar, and 
Administrator Gaynor (Mar. 13, 2020) (on file with the White House) (available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/letter-president-donald-j-trump-emergency-determination-
stafford-act/).  
 246. Tamara Keith & Malaka Gharib, A Timeline of Coronavirus Comments From President Trump And WHO, 
NPR (Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/04/15/835011346/a-timeline-of-
coronavirus-comments-from-president-trump-and-who. 
 247. Washington’s stay-at-home order extended to May 4, KING5 (Apr. 2, 2020), 
https://www.king5.com/article/news/health/coronavirus/inslee-extends-washington-stay-home-mandate-
through-may-4/281-e08790db-aa54-4718-8e2b-a7712ebc92e5.  
 248. Coronavirus Disease 2019: Nursing Homes & Long-Term Care Facilities, CDC, 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/hcp/long-term-care.html (last updated Apr. 15, 2020).  
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VII.  CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
Business closures, layoffs, financial losses, negligence, physical injuries, and event 
cancellations created an unprecedented risk to corporations immeasurable to any other 
event in American history. The chaos of the pandemic opened the door to opportunistic 
litigators seeking the chance to file class action lawsuits on behalf of employees, 
consumers, patients, and injured citizens who allege they were disproportionately harmed 
by the COVID-19 pandemic. As no industry appears to be litigation proof, corporations 
must prepare for exhaustive legal battles in both the private and public sectors. 
A. Categories of Lawsuits. 
There are several industries at high risk for COVID-19 class action lawsuits. 
Lawsuits have already been filed in each of the six (6) major industries identified below. 
First, class action lawsuits against insurers. Insurance providers arguably have the 
highest risk for COVID-19 class action lawsuits.249 Insurers have seen a high volume of 
class action litigation since the start of the pandemic arising from force majeure and other 
contractual claims.250 These insurers have a heighted risk to these types of claims because 
of their presence across a plethora of industries and situations.251
Second, class action lawsuits against travel and event providers. Travel agencies, 
entertainment venues and attractions, and ticket brokers face litigation for event-related 
cancellations and travel.252 It appears that the U.S. airlines industry has been hit especially 
hard with class action lawsuits against four (4) major airliners.253 United Airlines, Delta 
Air Lines, American Airlines, and Southwest Airlines have all been sued by customers for 
claims involving COVID-19-related cancellations, limited flight booking dates and 
refund-related complaints.254
In the Delta Air Lines class action lawsuit, Plaintiffs allege the airliner participated 
in unfair and deceitful practices by failing to honor its ticket refund policies and requests 
from passengers during the coronavirus outbreak.255 According to Plaintiffs, Delta Air 
Lines’ (“Delta”) Contract of Carriage states that, if the airline cancelled or changed a flight 
time by more than ninety (90) minutes, passengers were entitled to the option of a full 
249. See, e.g., Ed Treleven, Class-action lawsuit joins growing number over business interruption insurance 
denials amid COVID-19 pandemic, WIS. STATE J. (Apr. 30, 2020), https://madison.com/wsj/news/local/crime-
and-courts/class-action-lawsuit-joins-growing-number-over-business-interruption-insurance-denials-amid-
covid-19-pandemic/article_e9f48697-6a31-54fd-bd72-1c2d7a8b1f0d.html. 
 250. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Oliver, Contractual Distancing: Pandemic Insurance Litigation Spreads with 
Business Interruption Claim Denials, NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 19, 2020), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/contractual-distancing-pandemic-insurance-litigation-spreads-business-
interruption. 
 251. Cruise lines, airlines, and other travel companies have been sued for allegedly failing to maintain a safe 
environment and for alleged damages relating to delays or cancellations. 
252. See, e.g., Complaint at 4, Rudolph, et al. v. United Airlines Holdings, Inc., et al., No. 1:20-cv-02142 
(N.D. Ill. filed Apr. 6, 2020); Complaint at 4, Daniels, et al. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 1:20-cv-01664-ELR 
(N.D. Ga. filed Apr. 17, 2020); Complaint at 4, Ward, et al. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 4:20-cv-00371-Y (N.D. 
Tex. filed Apr. 22, 2020); Complaint at 2, Bombin, et al. v. S.W. Airlines Co., No. 5:20-cv-01883 (E.D. Pa. filed 
Apr. 13, 2020). 
253. See sources cited supra note 252. 
254. See sources cited supra note 252. 
 255. Complaint at 2, Daniels, No. 1:20-cv-01664-ELR (N.D. Ga. filed Apr. 17, 2020). 
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refund.256 Delta is alleged to have violated its policy by only issuing travel credits instead 
of full refunds to its customers.257 Further, Plaintiffs claim Delta’s website had a 
“Coronavirus Travel Updates” banner and a large red button to entice consumers to 
“Change or Cancel” their flights, yet does not include or provide easy access to the full 
refund request form.258 The lawsuit against Delta seeks refunds on original ticket 
purchases, punitive damages, and injunctive relief for cancelled flight reimbursement.259
Third, class action lawsuits against financial institutions and debt collectors.
COVID-19 has sparked civil action against lenders and debt collectors to prevent punitive 
measures being taken against terminated and furloughed employees unable to pay their 
expenditures.260 The United States government stepped in to provide temporary relief to 
debtors, but inevitably foreclosures and debt collections have led to substantial litigation 
against financial institutions seeking to recover on past-due loans and mortgages.261
Fourth, class action lawsuits against retailers who price gouge products during the 
pandemic. From the early days of the COVID-19 outbreak in the United States, 
opportunistic retailers took advantage of the national crisis as a money-making scheme.262
High-demand items such as hand sanitizer, toilet paper, face masks, digital thermometers, 
and surgical gowns were sold at dramatic markups.263 The inflation rates of some essential 
items became so severe that President Trump issued an Executive Order making it illegal 
to hoard and price gouge critical medical supplies needed to combat COVID-19.264
Already, consumers have filed legal action against major retailers who have participated 
in price-hiking tactics. For example, Amazon.com has been sued for its alleged price 
gouging of toilet paper and hand sanitizer at the beginning of the coronavirus pandemic.265
E-commerce giant, eBay Inc., has also been sued in a class action lawsuit by consumers 
who are alleged to have paid upwards of $585.00 for a three-pack of N95 masks, the same 
product that sold for less than $10.00 prior to the virus outbreak.266 Consumers also stated 
they paid $227.50 for a five-pack of Lysol spray cans and almost $50.00 for twelve (12) 
rolls of Cottonelle toilet paper.267 These examples are just two of the dozens of major 
256. Id. at 5.  
257. Id.
258. Id. at 5–6.
259. Id. at 15–16. 
260. See, e.g., Complaint at 1, Shu , et al. v. Bank of Am., et al., No. 5:20-cv-00184 (S.D.W. Va. filed Mar. 
20, 2020). 
 261. On March 27, 2020, President Donald J. Trump signed into law the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and 
Economic Security (CARES) Act with a sixty (60)-day foreclosure moratorium covering most American 
residential mortgage loans. CARES Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281 (2020). 
262. See, e.g., Complaint at 3, Armas v. Amazon.com Inc., No. 104631782 (11th Cir. 2020). 
263. See id.; Long Island Man Charged Under Defense Production Act with Hoarding and Price-Gouging of 
Scarce Personal Protective Equipment, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao-
edny/pr/long-island-man-charged-under-defense-production-act-hoarding-and-price-gouging-scarc-0. 
 264. E.g., disposable masks, surgical gowns, ventilators, and other professional protective equipment. WHITE 
HOUSE, President Donald J. Trump Will Not Tolerate the Price Gouging and Hoarding of Critical Supplies 
Needed to Combat the Coronavirus (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-
statements/president-donald-j-trump-will-not-tolerate-price-gouging-hoarding-critical-supplies-needed-combat-
coronavirus/. 
 265. Complaint at 3, Armas, No. 104631782. 
 266. Complaint, eBay Inc. v. Boch, et al., No. 5:19-cv004422 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
267. Id.
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retailers facing civil litigation for price gouging during the national crisis.268
Fifth, class actions against manufacturers and/or retailers of professional protective 
gear and products. The maker of Purell hand sanitizer is facing two class action lawsuits 
by consumers claiming the manufacturer made misleading claims when it advertised that 
its product killed “99.9 percent of illness-causing germs.”269 The Plaintiffs alleged the 
claims are not based in scientific fact and that Purell made substantial profit during the 
pandemic while breaking the public’s trust.270 This is not the first instance where Purell 
has been accused of playing off the fears of the public by alleged misrepresentation of its 
product’s effectiveness against diseases like the coronavirus.271 On January 17, 2020, 
Purell was warned by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration that it needed to refrain from 
advertising unsubstantiated claims that its products effectively killed the flu and many 
infectious diseases.272 As the products will be in high demand for the foreseeable future, 
it is likely this will become a heavily litigated industry by decade’s end.
Finally, class action lawsuits against issuers. As discussed in greater detail in the 
D&O Liability section of this article, securities class action lawsuits are a major area of 
COVID-19 corporate litigation.273 These lawsuits center around corporate mishandlings 
and deceitful behavior related to the pandemic and pandemic-related business 
decisions.274 Corporations in industries across the country have received backlash in the 
form of securities class action lawsuits by shareholders for share losses sustained during 
the national crisis and allegedly due to the business decisions of directors and officers of 
the corporations.275
B. Available Defenses to Class Action Claims. 
Several potential defenses are available to corporations facing COVID-19-related 
class action lawsuits. Specific defenses will be determined based on consideration of the 
legal contracts and agreements and the factual circumstances of subject litigation. The 
major areas of defense are discussed in detail below. 
Personal jurisdiction. A defendant must determine if there are grounds to challenge 
personal jurisdiction at the commencement of the litigation.276 Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(2) provides that a party may assert the lack of personal jurisdiction 
defense before pleading. In a civil class action lawsuit, a defendant must look at each 
 268. Costco, Walmart, Kroger, and several other merchants are named retailers in class action lawsuits for the 
alleged price gouging of essential groceries such as eggs. Michael Batriromo, Costco, Walmart, Kroger ‘Grossly 
Inflated’ the Price of Eggs During Pandemic, Lawsuit Claims, OZARKSFIRST (May 3, 2020), 
https://www.ozarksfirst.com/life-health/coronavirus/costco-walmart-kroger-grossly-inflated-the-price-of-eggs-
during-pandemic-lawsuit-claims/. 
269. Complaint at 1–2, Miller, et al. v. Gojo Indus., et al., No. 4:2020-cv-00562 (N.D. Ohio 2020). 
270. Id.
 271. Letter from Nicholas F. Lyons, Director of Compliance, FDA, to Carey Jaros, President and CEO, GOJO 
industries Inc. (Jan. 17, 2020) (On file with the FDA).  
272. Id.
273. See, e.g., Complaint at 1–2, Douglas, 2020 WL 1226410 (S.D. 2020); Complaint at 2, McDermid, 2020 
WL 1227260 (E.D. Pa. 2020). 
274. See, e.g., id.
275. See, e.g., id.
 276. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
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plaintiff’s cause of action and its specific connection to the forum to determine if the court 
has general or specific jurisdiction over the defendant for every individual claim.277 If the 
nexus is insufficient, a defendant should file a motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction prior to filing its answer.278 It is also vital to note that this defense must be 
asserted within a defendant’s first responsive pleading or the defense will be waived.
Lack of standing. Adequate substitution in a bargained-for exchange is a defense 
against civil action lawsuits for breach of contract. For example, events that were simply 
postponed during the shutdown and rescheduled during a time after the reopening of the 
economy provide acceptable substitutions for performance in many cases. Defendants 
should argue that plaintiffs have no standing in these circumstances as in many scenarios 
no injury ultimately occurred. 
No breach. Class action defendants must consider if the relevant contracts contained 
provisions which allowed them to substitute services or reparation for equal/greater than 
contract price. These are common and enforceable provisions that offer an avenue to 
perform the contract in a different manner and effectively litigate a no-breach defense.   
Force majeure. Class action lawsuits resulting from breach of contract claims must 
raise the defense that COVID-19 constitutes a force majeure event  rendering contractual 
performance impossible.279 Force majeure provisions are found in several commercial 
agreements and provide a contractual defense that holds a party harmless when events 
from a “superior force” or “act of  God” render performance impossible.280 In the United 
States, contractual interpretation and disputes are governed by state law; a defendant must 
look to prior catastrophic occurrences for legal precedent and guidance on how the court 
will rule on COVID-19 breach of contract claims. 
Frustration of purpose or impossibility. If a contract does not contain a force
majeure provision, a defendant may still argue that COVID-19 irreparably frustrated the 
purpose of its contract or simply made performance an impossibility.281 If the contract is 
for the sale or lease of goods, then Uniform Commercial Code §§ 2.615 and 2A.405 are 
the best defense against the impracticability of the contract. For example, if an event 
planner contracted with a local tavern for beverage supply for a large St. Patrick’s Day 
event but the event was canceled due to the coronavirus outbreak, this would constitute a 
frustration of purpose of their contractual agreement.282 If unforeseen circumstances 
render the purpose of the contract frustrated or impossible to perform, there are legal 
grounds for breaking the contract without liability for breach.283
Enforcement of class action waiver or arbitration provisions. It is common for 
employment-related agreements to contain waivers and provisions within the contract that 
prohibit class action litigation for alternative dispute resolution platforms such as 
277. Bristol-Meyers Squibb v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017). 
 278. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
279. See Christine Mathias, Coronavirus and Business Contracts: When Performance Becomes Impossible or 
Impracticable, NOLO, https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/coronavirus-and-business-contracts-when-
performance-becomes-impossible-or-impracticable.html (last visited May 13, 2020) (emphasis added). 
280. See id.




Baird: Litigating an Invisible Enemy: Will the United States Insurance I
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2020
204 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:169 
arbitration.284 Class action lawsuit waivers have been upheld by the United States 
Supreme Court and will undoubtedly be contested in several COVID-19 cases brought 
before the courts.285 Defendants and employers will likely succeed in enforcing these 
waivers for the arbitration alternative based on legal precedent.286
Unenforceability due to changes in applicable law. Stay-at-home executive orders 
and government-mandated non-essential business closures made it impossible for certain 
service contracts and agreements to be fulfilled. Under these circumstances, class action 
defendants will succeed against claims of breach in contracts where performance was 
made illegal under COVID-19 executive orders.  
Lack of causation. In class action lawsuits for intentional and negligent torts, 
plaintiffs must establish the nexus between the alleged harm and the defendants’ conduct. 
As discussed in the D&O Liability section of this article, the physical and economic 
devastation from the pandemic provides a strong intervening cause defense to the 
presumption that a class action defendant’s actions directly caused the alleged injury. 
Economic loss doctrine. This defense is available when plaintiffs inflate their 
damages to unreasonable or unrealistic monetary value.287 In Halcrow, Inc. v. Eighth 
Judicial District Court, the court ruled that the economic loss doctrine barred the plaintiff’s 
negligent misrepresentation claim against a general contractor for work performed by an 
undisclosed subcontractor.288 The Halcrow court reasoned that the economic loss doctrine 
is justified in order to properly protect parties from unlimited or inflated economic liability 
in professional negligence claims.289 While the full scope of the doctrine is jurisdictionally 
dependent, defendants to class action claims must argue the economic loss doctrine to 
protect themselves against excessive plaintiff recovery.290
Lack of class commonality. Class action defendants must evaluate the legal and 
factual distinctions of plaintiffs’ claims in order to defeat class action certification. 
Legally, defendants must look for differences in the relevant timeframe and contractual 
language of each plaintiff’s claim. Factually, defendants may find distinct variations in the 
circumstances leading to the alleged harmful conduct. Defendants must evaluate this 
evidence to consider if there is a lack of commonality among plaintiffs sufficient to defeat 
the class action certification.  
VIII. THE POST-PANDEMIC AMERICAN JURY POOL
There has been a noticeable shift in the public’s opinion of the United States’ judicial 
system over the last several decades. At the turn of the century, the tort reform political 
movement was thriving, and anti-litigation mentality strongly resonated with everyday 
284. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1618 (2018). 
285. See id.
286. See id.
287. Halcrow, Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 302 P.3d 1148 (Nev. 2013). 
 288. Id. at 1150. 
 289. Id. 
 290. Gale Burns, TORTS: Economic Loss Doctrine as a Bar to Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, NAT.
LEGAL RESEARCH GRP. INC. (Dec. 30, 2013, 4:12 PM), http://www.nlrg.com/public-law-legal-
research/bid/101458/TORTS-Economic-Loss-Doctrine-as-a-Bar-to-Negligent-Misrepresentation-Claims. 
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Americans.291 The main concerns for our judicial system centered around a perceived 
unhealthy trend of frivolous lawsuits and exaggerated damages.292 The majority of 
citizens were of the opinion that the extensive influx of litigation in the court systems was 
damaging to the American economy and the root cause of increasing insurance premiums 
across the country.293 However, corporate condemnation had been slowly building since 
the early 2000s after a series of white-collar corruption scandals and corporate executive 
arrests.294 By decade’s end, the impact of corporate catastrophes like the Enron collapse 
transformed the prospective juror mentality from plaintiff skepticism to the anti-corporate 
attitude of present day.295
A. Historical Overview of Social Inflation and Nuclear Verdicts. 
Long before the COVID-19 shutdown, the United States endured the largest 
economic disaster since the Great Depression during the 2008 financial crisis.296 By 2009, 
the flood of stories about billion dollar corporate bailouts stood in stark contrast to the 
apparent lack of safety nets being provided to working class America.297 For many 
Americans, the story of the 2008 financial catastrophe was simple: Wall Street had been 
bailed out and Main Street had been abandoned.  
In the years that followed, the market bounced back and progressed through its 
longest expansion in history.298 Meanwhile, employment rates and hourly wages remained 
stagnant.299 As the middle class shrank, the American jury pool began to shape a “two 
Americas: one for the elite and one for the rest of us” mentality.300 Jurors have steadily 
shifted their concern away from the harm of frivolous lawsuits and towards the threat of 
corrupt executives and unbridled corporate influence and power.301 The culture eventually 
shifted so strongly that large corporations were being demonized as a group and believed 
to be guilty unless proven innocent.302 Consequently, jury verdicts exploded because anti-
corporate beliefs had become the norm, and the pervasive loss of trust was being reflected 
in the deliberation room.303
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Prior to the coronavirus pandemic, a major topic at litigation and risk management 
conferences was the concept of social inflation—a sociological term used to describe a 
multifaceted trend toward the deterioration of tort reform, increased litigation, more 
plaintiff-favorable judicial rulings, generous verdicts, and the onset of the once 
unthinkable phenomenon of litigation financing.304 Historically speaking, social inflation 
and the resulting tide of outsized verdicts have been the result of a decade of pervasive 
anti-corporate attitudes, general pessimism and tribal politics activated and accelerated by 
the 2008 financial collapse.305 Looking forward, it is imperative for defendants to 
understand the post-pandemic American jury pool mentality and if the social inflation 
trend survives the outbreak.  
B. The Post-Pandemic Factfinder.  
The factual basis of a claim is at the heart of every jury decision. The “story” told 
during litigation is essential to how jurors will receive, store, recall, and process the 
evidence. As a result, whichever party can tell the story better will have a major impact on 
how jurors will evaluate the choices and conduct of the parties involved in the litigation. 
Post-pandemic factfinders will analyze the claims by evaluating the intentions of the 
parties. Was this person driven by selfishness or sacrifice? Are their plans clever or 
crooked? Were their behaviors understandable or careless? Jurors will not always 
understand all the technical facts, demonstratives and expert testimony so they will 
construct the answers to these questions in the context of a narrative. 
Jurors’ preconceived notions of a plaintiff’s or defendant’s moral character will 
ultimately determine who must carry the burden of proof at trial. The COVID-19 pandemic 
will once again show that new crises can alter old assumptions. During the last century, 
we have seen juror perceptions sway from giving defendant insurers and corporations the 
benefit of the doubt to forcing them to prove  they are “one of the good ones.”306 The 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on any particular area of litigation will depend on 
which groups emerge from the crisis as heroes and which emerge as villains.  
The first responders, medical professionals, and essential workers are the heroes of 
a post-pandemic America. Parties to a lawsuit who are essential workers will have a 
stronger advantage in litigation than they did before the COVID-19 crisis. Stories of 
essential workers unable to quarantine are often juxtaposed with stories of the elite who 
experience the pandemic as a momentary inconvenience.307
Despite the demands of first responders, the American workforce has experienced 
unprecedented rates of unemployment from the COVID-19 economic shutdown.308
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Verdicts in employment litigation hinge on whether jurors can best see themselves in the 
shoes of the employee or the employer. The impact of having thirty-six (36) million 
citizens live through the stress, trauma and aftermath of unemployment during the 
government-ordered shutdowns must not be underestimated.309 The gratitude of the nation 
is so strong that doctors and nurses in medical malpractice suits are more likely to be 
viewed favorably even in non-COVID-19-related cases. Meanwhile, stories of 
incompetence, corruption and fraud underlying the lack of medical supplies and infectious 
disease readiness could result in the broad demonizing of health care administrators.  
Historically, in nursing home litigation, it has been common for jurors to express a 
belief that the wage-and-hour staff were likely undertrained, unskilled, and perhaps even 
morally suspect. COVID-19 stories of the sacrifice and heroism of aging services staff and 
medical professionals have changed these assumptions radically and thus changed the risk 
profile for aging services claims even if no COVID-19-relevant facts or claims are present. 
Consequently, any nursing home or long-term care facility that is accused of being 
unprepared for even a normal flu season may become a flashpoint for juror outrage.  
As the country shifts from quarantine to a post-pandemic America, attention will 
increasingly be turned toward finding someone to blame. The stories of corruption, fraud, 
incompetence, and collusion are surfacing during America’s worst economic crisis, and 
litigation involving claims reminiscent of these stories are a target for juror anger and 
frustration. 
IX. CONCLUSION
  Retired United States Army Command Sergeant Major Michael Mabee once said, 
“[w]e are not preparing for the world we live in—we are preparing for the world we find 
ourselves in.”310 This statement holds true now more than ever. The influx of 
unprecedented civil litigation creates an intense pressure on the judiciary to rule in a 
manner that is both fair and consistent during extraordinary times. As the United States 
emerges from the COVID-19 crisis, it is necessary that the American legal system fluently 
adapts to post-pandemic litigation and that policymakers and judicature engage in a civil 
dialogue which ensures a just societal outcome. 
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